Comprehensive Review and Analysis of COVID-19 Response: Lessons Learned and Future Strategies


Summary and Key Points

The document addresses several myths and misconceptions surrounding COVID-19, vaccines, and public health measures. It combines personal anecdotes, data, and opinions to refute these myths while offering a critical perspective on societal responses to the pandemic.
See also a link to the officially released report = COVID Select Concludes 2-Year Investigation, Issues 500+ Page Final Report on Lessons Learned and the Path Forward (Selected USA Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic concluded its two-year investigation into the COVID-19 pandemic and released a final report titled “After Action Review of the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Lessons Learned and a Path Forward.”)


Key Points by Myth:

1. Social Distancing Works

  • Social distancing is effective against viruses, as evidenced by educational campaigns in Italy. However, panic and misinformation undermined its implementation in other places.
  • Criticism of public health policies often ignores the lack of public education on viruses and vaccines.

2. Masks are Effective

  • Masks reduce virus transmission, even if they don’t block 100%.
  • Personal protective equipment like masks serves multiple purposes, including air filtration in polluted environments.

3. Lockdowns and Mental Health

  • Lockdowns had varied psychological impacts. The author argues that social adaptation and personal preparedness can mitigate trauma.
  • Opportunities like virtual learning and events (e.g., Tony Robbins seminars) emerged during lockdowns.

4. Vaccines Slowed the Virus Spread

  • Vaccines are vital for public health, as demonstrated historically by increased life expectancy.
  • The creation and deployment of COVID-19 vaccines involved complex logistics and global coordination.

5. Political Influence on Vaccine Approval

  • Vaccine approval processes were expedited during the pandemic, with political pressure playing a role (e.g., Donald Trump’s efforts).
  • Skepticism toward pharmaceutical companies is common but often ignores the critical role of vaccines in saving lives.

6. School Closures

  • The closure of schools had negative impacts, particularly on mental health and education systems.
  • Despite these challenges, online learning systems were rapidly implemented, and technology-enabled global education initiatives.

7. Vaccine Side Effects

  • Side effects are often due to pre-existing conditions or improper screening before vaccination, not the vaccines themselves.
  • Medications are statistically far more likely to cause adverse reactions than vaccines.

Broader Themes and Critiques:

  • Misinformation and Media Panic: The media’s tendency to sensationalize issues fueled public panic rather than providing clear guidance.
  • Education Deficiencies: A lack of public understanding about science and health systems exacerbates vaccine hesitancy and distrust in public health measures.
  • The Role of Leadership: Both political and scientific leaders influenced public perception and vaccine rollout success, though often with mixed results.
  • Value of Learning: Emphasis on education as the key to combating ignorance and ensuring societal progress.

Takeaways:

  1. Public health measures like masks, social distancing, and vaccines are scientifically supported and crucial during pandemics.
  2. The effectiveness of these measures is often undermined by misinformation, poor public education, and media sensationalism.
  3. Preparation, adaptability, and education are vital for managing crises like COVID-19 effectively.
  4. Trust in science and informed decision-making are necessary to combat future health challenges.

Details

Myth = 3. Social distancing measures were arbitrary and not based on science
Social distancing works against viruses. On Italian television, there were series with biologists and virologists explaining from scratch what viruses and vaccines are, and people understood what to do. They followed all the distancing rules and the lines drawn on the asphalt and in stores. Here, there was only panic and batches of vaccines seized. Okay, there were exceptions, like those chasing me on the street shouting “Bastardo,” questioning why I wore a mask and didn’t shake their hands.
Then there was a scandal because the Ministry of Health ordered many vaccines. Well, that was its duty. How could they know the education system was in shambles, most people had no idea what viruses were, and they read reports like this one, written by others who exploit ignorance to make money with nonsense? How could they know that television, in the race for ratings, would do what all TV stations worldwide are tempted to do—spread PANIC?
Paradoxically and ironically, the same TV stations now criticize the Ministry of Health (with reports, tables, and sensational figures … “You have no idea what you’re losing,” “Breaking News”)—how stupid.

Myth = 4. There is no conclusive evidence that wearing masks prevented the spread of COVID-19
Masks work. Perhaps they mean that masks don’t block 100%.
Those who don’t believe this should try spray-painting cars without a mask.
I still use professional masks like PP2 (or whatever they’re called, there are various grades and two comparison systems) for unblocking toilets in basements or at neighbors’ homes who ruin the whole villa with their mess, or for cleaning glasses with strange chemical sprays.
Even wearing a mask alone in the car works because car filters are not designed for viruses (not necessary on highways, but if you’re driving at 5 km/h through northern Paris among street vendors lining kilometers of sidewalks…). Next time you point fingers at an elderly person wearing a mask alone in their car … you’re the blonde (fool).


What Did Not Work in the Masks at the Wuhan Military Laboratory?

The real question is this: What failed in the masks used at the Wuhan military laboratory? And most importantly, how can we improve masks to prevent similar failures in the future?

This topic reminds me of a striking image: the special protective suit and mask worn by Vladimir Putin when he entered a biological military laboratory. The footage aired at the time, showcasing an intense moment. Strangely enough, during that critical period, both China and Russia were the first to land planes and laboratories in Italy, offering immediate help, while the European Union was still locked in endless discussions. As the EU talked and talked, Italy faced increasing devastation, with more and more lives lost.

Ironically, the Big Bosses of the EU, many of whom have medicine diplomas according to their CVs, seemed paralyzed in action while Italy was dying. Meanwhile, the global narrative focused on painting Trump with “funny labels” rather than questioning the EU leadership’s delayed response.

Eventually, the EU stepped up, organized, and delivered the vaccine—a milestone that deserves credit. And yes, I took four doses of it, appreciating the results. However, the lessons remain: rapid action, decisive leadership, and technological improvement, such as better mask designs, are essential to preventing such disasters in the future.


Myth = 5. The effects of lockdowns were mostly mental and psychological trauma for the population, especially the youth
I was dropped into cities where I didn’t know the language for very long periods, and I suffered no trauma.
On the contrary, more social opportunities arose, like tons of courses, including a 5-day one with Tony Robbins, attended by 25,000 people online, displayed live on giant monitors in a super studio specially built during COVID.
I was prepared for these traumas—on my first flights, I only thought about chess player Fischer, who isolated himself before championships (or maybe I just convinced myself it was possible to cope), and the person who barricaded himself to make manifestos—if you remember that movie. What actually happened? I didn’t have five free minutes. So, traumas arise in those predisposed to them, repeating endlessly, “Now I have trauma. If I look out the window, I’ll feel traumatized. Let me look out the window now” (Don’t try this at home; it’s a negative example).

Myth = 6. There is no evidence that COVID vaccines stopped or slowed the spread of the virus
I’ve reached 60 years of age thanks to vaccines. Check how long our ancestors lived before vaccines. Learn how vaccines are made and why the inventor tested it on himself without reading reports.

Myth = 7. The Biden administration pressured the FDA to approve vaccines, even though several FDA-affiliated scientists opposed it
Donald J. Trump led the creation of the vaccine and pressured the FDA to approve it faster. The vaccine was deliberately delayed to be released three days after the election (Georgescu’s tricks in the USA).
There were endless meetings and press conferences, lasting months. But if you believed all the labels attached to Trump, you didn’t follow how the vaccine was created. I would go to the pharmacy on the ground floor of my building and buy whatever was discussed in meetings hours before doctors and pharmacists in Italy woke up and emptied the stock.
Biden didn’t do much here—as you may have noticed, he has simpler issues to handle—and was inaugurated three months after the vaccine appeared (launched three days post-election—another scam like Georgescu).
Trump implemented military measures to convert factories into ventilator production (like Putin now with armaments) and vaccines. He squeezed Big Pharma in endless meetings. Now, books claim Big Pharma charged $10 per vaccine instead of $1. The truth is, if I had come to your door with a $100 vaccine, you would have paid it and been indebted to me for life, greeting me from the end of the street. After the war, all kinds of opportunists come out to sell us reports. He negotiated everything he could.
But the real heroes were people like Bill Gates, who built factories before the vaccine even existed or was approved (super idea!). After realizing no one understood what he was doing, he recently started frequent blogs and videos on 1,000 topics, hoping we might understand something. An employee in a Netflix documentary about him said, “He goes to meetings where he knows ten times more than everyone else in the room—I don’t really understand why he attends.”


Myth = 8. There was no scientific support for closing schools. It had multiple negative effects. Suicide attempts among girls aged 12-17 increased by 51%.
I carried tons of servers and electronic lessons to schools all over Romania long before COVID. I conducted week-long training sessions with inspectors across the country, teaching them to create electronic lessons and lead their counties to do the same. I personally ensured that every one of them completed their work. No one left without generating electronic lessons covering all possible components. Paradoxically, when COVID began, kids worldwide launched new online education systems from scratch in record time.
Look now on YouTube—so many AI super-gurus publish free courses (people earning millions of dollars share knowledge for free on YouTube). You’d need 500 years to learn it all. It’s not lessons or teachers that are missing.
But if you remove Physics from exams and replace it with Religion, students dance on desks, stab teachers, and drug dealers’ mothers expel police from schools because “the poor boy was stressed,” it’s no wonder the education system is now on its knees, sinking in a swamp. No wonder 50% of vaccines go to waste.
At the vaccination center in Brașov (since I couldn’t get an appointment in Bucharest), I talked more than all the doctors there combined. On my way out, I noticed that the vaccine batch was the one seized in Italy two days earlier, which was all over the news. Televisions stressed out all the doctors in Romania and saw people with two university degrees hesitate before the nonsense spread on TV and online (Georgescu wasn’t the first “black hole” in rational thought). How is it possible that I talked more than all the doctors in a vaccination unit? They all stared at the ground.
At another vaccine center, a doctor told us to sign a document saying the vaccine had expired. I, along with two Chinese people, signed it. What could possibly expire in a few months in a vaccine? If it was launched out of sequence to prevent deaths before approval, it’s normal for the expiration date to be approximate. It doesn’t have five years of tests to determine the exact expiry date.
I’ve had 16 vaccines so far because I spent an extended period in Brazil, and some are mandatory (they refuse you at customs without them—random checks). I had something like three injections in one arm, a 20-minute break, then three in the other arm…
I look in disbelief at people who still read all kinds of reports and refuse to vaccinate.

Myth = Side Effects
Yes, I’ve studied this super myth that scares everyone:

  1. No pre-vaccine testing is conducted. You fill out a declaration, and some people lie in their answers (e.g., “Do you have a cough, throat irritation, chills…?”). Those who already have COVID lie or don’t yet show symptoms (you’ve traveled a ton of kilometers to get a vaccine, and now you’re going to check the “wrong” boxes on the form—clearly, they’ll send you home—or they’ll test you, and you’ll have to return in three days). These are the ones with side effects (it can be verified that the reported side effects align with COVID symptoms and effects). But if you don’t verify, you’ll fall for scammers selling books (including Kennedy). Now Kennedy is big in the Trump Administration for NAME and VOTES. Otherwise, Trump wore gloves even when young, is obsessed with viruses, and doesn’t eat after shaking hands (even with waiters). This means he’s carried virus-related questions all his life and may know more than the conmen labeling him and publishing “unproven” reports.
    Think about how much you know compared to others due to the peculiar questions you’ve carried with you.
  2. A medication is 1,000 times more dangerous than a vaccine. But if people don’t know how medications and vaccines are made, they believe the stories about Kennedy and Big Pharma… Those with allergies, adverse effects, or secondary reactions to medications know better—they didn’t experience those from vaccines but from a narrow set of medications that don’t match their DNA, body, other medications, or existing conditions or weaknesses.

So, if someone asks whether it’s useful to pay attention in school, learn everything, follow the curriculum and more, and read lots of books, you can respond:

  • If you don’t learn, you’ll die!
    Teachers are free medicine—when a teacher tells you to read a book, you should read two!
    (You probably already know friends or relatives you didn’t advise during COVID… and who are no longer with us.)

The document ends here, but I still want to learn. No problem.
Link to Google Doc


The original US Report is described here
https://oversight.house.gov/release/final-report-covid-select-concludes-2-year-investigation-issues-500-page-final-report-on-lessons-learned-and-the-path-forward

Declassified Reports on Romanian Prezidential Elections – 2024: Insights into Cybersecurity, Social Media Manipulation, and Geopolitical Interference



A comprehensive analysis of declassified reports detailing social media manipulation, cyberattacks, Russian influence, and institutional challenges affecting Romanian elections, highlighting key tactics, vulnerabilities, and broader geopolitical implications.

Summary

The declassified documents provide a detailed overview of the coordinated strategies, actors, and vulnerabilities exploited during Romania’s 2024 presidential elections. They uncover a hybrid operation involving cyberattacks, social media manipulation, and propaganda campaigns. The primary focus was on amplifying the visibility and influence of candidate Călin Georgescu while leveraging disinformation to undermine democratic processes. The findings reveal a complex interplay of state-sponsored cyber operations, domestic and international networks, and the strategic misuse of social media platforms like TikTok.

Key Points

1. Social Media Manipulation (TikTok-Centric Campaigns)

  • Influencer Recruitment: Over 100 influencers with a combined 8 million followers were unknowingly involved in promoting Călin Georgescu through coordinated hashtags (#echilibrusiverticalitate, #prezidentiale2024).
  • Unmarked Campaigns: TikTok and other platforms failed to enforce labeling rules for political content, allowing unchecked dissemination of videos and narratives.
  • Replicated Tactics: Campaign strategies closely mirrored Russia’s operations in Ukraine and Moldova, emphasizing targeted narratives and covert coordination.

2. Cyberattacks and IT System Vulnerabilities

  • Targeted Electoral Infrastructure: Systems managed by the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) and Special Telecommunications Service (STS) were attacked with sophisticated methods like SQL Injection and Cross-Site Scripting.
  • Scope of Attacks: Over 85,000 cyberattacks from entities in 33 countries were recorded during the election period, aimed at data theft, system compromise, and misinformation.

3. Russian Influence and Hybrid Warfare

  • Strategic Objectives:
    • Promote euroskeptic, pro-Russian, and extremist candidates.
    • Undermine NATO and EU credibility within Romania.
    • Amplify societal divisions and erode public trust in democratic institutions.
  • Disinformation Tactics:
    • AI-driven deepfakes, doctored images, and coordinated social media narratives to spread divisive and misleading information.
    • Use of troll farms, local influencers, and Telegram channels to evade detection and amplify messages.

4. Involvement of Extremist and Criminal Groups

  • Key Actors: Domestic extremist groups, ultranationalists, and organized crime networks mobilized resources to support the campaign.
  • Financial Incentives: Payments were coordinated through phantom companies and intermediaries, ensuring anonymity and complicating attribution.

5. Institutional Challenges

  • Failures in Enforcement: Despite attempts by Romanian electoral authorities to regulate online content, platforms like TikTok failed to comply fully, allowing unauthorized content to thrive.
  • Broader Risks: Romania’s position as a NATO and EU member made it a critical target for hybrid warfare aimed at destabilizing the region.

Conclusion

The attached documents collectively highlight the vulnerabilities in Romania’s electoral processes and the broader challenges of countering hybrid threats. The findings emphasize:

  1. Sophistication of Hybrid Warfare:
    • The operations involved a combination of cyberattacks, social media manipulation, and propaganda, demonstrating the evolution of election interference tactics.
  2. Systemic Weaknesses:
    • Insufficient enforcement of platform regulations and vulnerabilities in electoral infrastructure created opportunities for exploitation.
  3. Regional and Global Implications:
    • These actions are part of a larger pattern of Russian hybrid warfare, targeting NATO and EU cohesion while exploiting societal and institutional weaknesses in member states.
  4. Need for Countermeasures:
    • Strengthened cybersecurity defenses, stricter social media regulations, and international collaboration are necessary to mitigate such threats in the future.

This comprehensive analysis underscores the urgent need to bolster democratic safeguards and counter hybrid warfare strategies targeting both Romania and the broader European region.

SRI: Romanian Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informații) Doc 1 – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

This report details significant irregularities and suspicious activities associated with the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, particularly concerning the rapid rise in popularity of candidate Călin Georgescu. The document highlights the use of social media, particularly TikTok, to orchestrate a large-scale, coordinated campaign that leveraged algorithms, influencers, and external financing. Despite minimal declared campaign expenditures, extensive resources and sophisticated strategies were employed, raising questions about the legality and transparency of the election process.

Key Points

1. TikTok Campaign and Artificial Popularity Surge

  • Rapid Ascension: Călin Georgescu rose from <1% support in late October 2024 to 22.94% in the first-round election, largely attributed to a highly coordinated TikTok campaign.
  • Coordinated Network: A network of 25,000 TikTok accounts was activated two weeks before the election, with 797 accounts initially created in 2016 but dormant until November 2024.
  • Platform Exploitation: Algorithms were manipulated through hashtags (#CG, #diaspora), emojis, and pre-designed content distributed to users via Telegram.

2. Telegram as a Coordination Tool

  • Telegram channels like @propagatorcg provided detailed instructions to users on content creation and dissemination strategies, ensuring posts aligned with TikTok’s algorithms.
  • The channel’s membership surged from 1,088 to over 5,000 in a single week during the election period.

3. Use of Influencers

  • Prominent TikTok influencers supported Georgescu, either directly or subtly, embedding campaign tags in otherwise neutral posts.
  • Many influencers did not disclose the paid nature of their endorsements, violating transparency norms and electoral regulations.

4. Creation of Fake State Accounts

  • Several TikTok accounts falsely claimed affiliation with Romanian state institutions, such as the SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service), to lend credibility and imply institutional support for Georgescu.

5. Financing Mechanisms

  • Despite declaring no campaign expenditures, substantial funds supported the promotional activities:
    • The TikTok user “bogpr” (identified as Bogdan Peschir) donated over €1 million, with verified payments of $381,000 during the campaign.
    • Payments to influencers were funneled through FameUp and FA Agency, with offers of €1,000 per promotional video.

6. TikTok’s Conduct and Policy Violations

  • TikTok removed some campaign-related content following official Romanian requests but allowed much of it to remain visible within Romania and abroad, contravening electoral laws.
  • European think tanks criticized TikTok’s inadequate policies for managing electoral disinformation and its systemic risks to public discourse.

7. Connections to External Entities

  • Potential affiliations with Russian propaganda (e.g., Sputnik-linked networks) and connections to cryptocurrency-related entities suggest external influences.
  • The campaign’s financing included connections to South African entities, raising questions about foreign involvement.

8. Broader Implications

  • The report underscores systemic issues with TikTok as a platform for electoral manipulation, including its lack of enforcement of its own policies and transparency in advertising and data sharing.

Conclusion

The documented activities reflect a coordinated and resource-intensive campaign to artificially boost the visibility and perceived legitimacy of Călin Georgescu, violating Romanian electoral laws and highlighting vulnerabilities in social media platforms like TikTok. These findings call for stricter regulations and international cooperation to address electoral interference in the digital age.

SRI: Romanian Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informații) Doc 2 – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

This document highlights state-sponsored cyber operations targeting Romanian electoral infrastructure and coordinated efforts to boost the popularity of Călin Georgescu on TikTok during the 2024 presidential elections. It uncovers sophisticated cyberattacks aimed at compromising election systems, preferential treatment on social media platforms, and well-organized digital marketing campaigns. The findings suggest the involvement of a state actor with significant resources and expertise in cybersecurity and digital influence.


Key Points

1. Cyberattacks on Electoral Infrastructure

  • Targeted Systems: Attackers targeted critical election systems managed by the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) and Special Telecommunications Service (STS), including:
    • GIS Server: AEP’s compromised mapping server connected to both internal and external networks.
    • Election Monitoring Systems: Platforms like SIMPV, SICPV, and prezenta.roaep.ro were attacked, aiming to alter data integrity and disrupt availability.
  • Attack Methods:
    • SQL Injection: Malicious code was injected into databases to access or manipulate data.
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Attackers inserted malicious scripts into web pages, affecting other users.
  • Scale and Scope: Over 85,000 cyberattacks were launched, including during election day and the post-election period, using anonymization techniques across 33 countries.
  • Assessment: The attacks showcased a highly organized approach typical of state-sponsored actors.

2. TikTok’s Preferential Treatment

  • Boosted Visibility: TikTok did not mark Georgescu’s content as electoral, enabling widespread dissemination and significant visibility compared to other candidates whose posts were heavily filtered.
  • Violation of Electoral Rules:
    • TikTok failed to comply fully with the Romanian Electoral Authority’s (AEP) requests to remove or block unauthorized campaign materials.
    • Campaign materials continued to circulate within Romania and internationally, even after the election.
  • Early Warnings: TikTok had flagged Georgescu’s campaign as suspicious as early as 2020 but took no substantial action to restrict its activities.

3. Coordinated Digital Campaign

  • Sophisticated Strategies:
    • Telegram and Discord channels were used to coordinate posting schedules and evade detection on TikTok.
    • The campaign avoided bot farms, instead relying on human-operated accounts across various geolocations to circumvent detection.
    • Messages were disseminated through a “swarming” strategy, creating the illusion of organic support.
  • Expertise: The campaign demonstrated an advanced understanding of TikTok’s algorithms and policies, leveraging these to maximize impact.

4. Possible State Actor Involvement

  • Resources and Tactics:
    • The operation utilized extensive resources and expertise, suggesting involvement from a state actor or a highly capable entity.
    • No digital fingerprints linked devices or accounts, indicating meticulous planning and execution.
  • Marketing Firm: A professional digital marketing company played a central role, further complicating attribution.

5. Broader Implications

  • Sovereignist Party Involvement: Similar campaigns were identified for the newly founded Partidul Oamenilor Tineri (POT), which supported Georgescu.
  • Systemic Risks:
    • Social media platforms like TikTok pose significant risks to electoral integrity due to weak enforcement of their own policies and lack of transparency.
    • The incident highlights vulnerabilities in Romania’s electoral infrastructure and the growing threat of cyber influence operations.

Conclusion

The document underscores a multi-layered effort to manipulate public opinion and disrupt Romania’s electoral process through cyberattacks, social media influence, and well-coordinated disinformation campaigns. The evidence suggests the involvement of a state actor, raising serious concerns about electoral security and the role of social media in democratic processes.

SIE: Foreign Intelligence Service (Serviciul de Informații Externe) – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

This document details Russia’s hybrid warfare strategies targeting Romania’s electoral process, as well as its broader efforts to undermine Western democracies. It highlights Moscow’s use of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and the manipulation of public opinion to erode confidence in democratic institutions, amplify societal divisions, and promote pro-Russian or extremist candidates. The report underscores the increasing complexity and sophistication of these tactics, with a significant focus on leveraging social media platforms and AI-driven content creation.


Key Points

1. Russian Election Interference Strategies

  • History of Involvement: Russia has a documented history of interfering in elections globally, including the U.S. presidential election in 2016, and continues to employ similar tactics across Europe.
  • Goals:
    • Erode trust in democratic institutions.
    • Amplify divisions within societies.
    • Support pro-Russian, nationalist, or euroskeptic candidates and parties.
  • Methods:
    • Sociological studies to identify vulnerabilities in public opinion and electoral systems.
    • Aggressive propaganda campaigns using AI-generated content.
    • Creation of divisive narratives, often targeting NATO and EU policies.

2. Online Manipulation Tactics

  • Social Media and AI:
    • Extensive use of platforms like Telegram, TikTok, Facebook, and VKontakte to disseminate propaganda.
    • Use of AI tools to produce high-quality multimedia content, including deepfakes, to mislead and manipulate audiences.
    • Coordination of troll networks and local influencers to amplify pro-Russian narratives.
  • Targeted Narratives:
    • Discredit European and NATO leadership.
    • Promote fears of declining security and economic instability.
    • Undermine support for Ukraine and portray it as a destabilizing force.

3. Romania as a Key Target

  • Perceived Threat: Russia views Romania as a NATO ally directly threatening its security due to hosting U.S. military assets and its support for Ukraine.
  • Hostile Actions:
    • Cyberattacks and information leaks targeting Romanian infrastructure and electoral systems.
    • Narratives aimed at fostering distrust in NATO and EU alliances.
    • False claims of territorial ambitions against neighboring countries, such as Moldova and Ukraine.

4. Disinformation Campaigns

  • Narrative Amplification:
    • Distribution of divisive content via coordinated campaigns.
    • Use of manipulated or decontextualized images and videos to create fear and panic.
  • Targeted Groups:
    • Demographic-specific manipulation, particularly focusing on rural, religious, and economically vulnerable populations.
    • Exploitation of cultural and societal grievances to sow discord.
  • Example Techniques:
    • Cross-posting propaganda across multiple platforms using the same network of accounts.
    • Associating false incidents with Ukrainian refugees or resistance movements to undermine support for Ukraine.

5. Broader Geopolitical Context

  • Link to Moldova and Ukraine:
    • Parallel disinformation campaigns in Moldova aimed at destabilizing pro-Western governments.
    • Efforts to erode European solidarity for Ukraine by promoting social and economic grievances in NATO countries.
  • Localized Propaganda:
    • Leveraging local influencers to promote Kremlin narratives under the guise of grassroots movements.

Conclusion

The report reveals a well-coordinated and resource-intensive effort by Russia to influence Romanian elections and public opinion, part of its broader strategy to undermine NATO and EU cohesion. By exploiting technological advancements and social media platforms, Russia seeks to erode democratic stability, amplify societal divisions, and weaken support for Western alliances. This highlights the urgent need for robust countermeasures to address hybrid threats and protect democratic processes.

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerul Afacerilor Interne) – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

The final document outlines how social media manipulation, particularly through TikTok, was used to influence Romania’s 2024 presidential elections. It details a campaign characterized by the covert promotion of Călin Georgescu using influencers and coordinated hashtags, which mirrored tactics seen in Russian operations in Ukraine. The campaign leveraged micro-influencers and unmarked promotional content, suggesting external orchestration with ties to extremist and criminal groups. The report underscores the integration of social media manipulation with hybrid warfare strategies to destabilize democratic processes.


Key Points

1. Use of Social Media for Election Manipulation

  • Platform Exploitation:
    • Over 100 influencers with 8 million followers were unknowingly involved in promoting Călin Georgescu.
    • Campaign hashtags such as #echilibrusiverticalitate, #prezidentiale2024, and #unliderpotrivitpentrumine were heavily used across TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook.
    • TikTok failed to implement Electoral Bureau instructions for labeling campaign content.
  • Campaign Tactics:
    • Influencers were paid based on follower counts (e.g., 390 RON for 20,000 followers).
    • Many influencers were unaware of the candidate being promoted, leading to public backlash once the campaign was exposed.

2. Similarities with Russian Tactics

  • Replicating Prior Campaigns:
    • The campaign resembled Russia’s “Brother Beside Brother” operation in Ukraine, using identical coordination strategies and narrative themes.
    • Content creators followed strict guidelines regarding timing, soundtracks, emojis, and video narrative structures.
  • Covert Coordination:
    • The campaign involved methods to evade detection, including deleting all traces of the campaign online after execution.

3. Links to Extremist and Criminal Networks

  • Key Actors:
    • Prominent figures associated with far-right extremist ideologies, criminal organizations, and religious cults were involved in mobilizing support for the campaign.
    • These groups had histories of promoting pro-Russian, antisemitic, anti-NATO, and anti-Ukraine narratives.
  • Campaign Beneficiaries:
    • The campaign was orchestrated through intermediaries, including “phantom companies,” which coordinated influencer payments and guidelines.

4. Broader Implications

  • Cross-Border Operations:
    • Similar campaigns in Moldova and Ukraine reveal a regional pattern of election interference.
    • The Romanian campaign’s success highlights vulnerabilities in social media platforms to covert influence operations.
  • Eroding Democratic Trust:
    • The integration of extremist elements and manipulative campaigns risks undermining trust in democratic institutions and election processes.

Conclusion

The report provides clear evidence of a covert, well-coordinated campaign leveraging social media to influence Romania’s 2024 elections. This campaign reflects a sophisticated strategy aligned with hybrid warfare practices, combining social manipulation, extremist narratives, and cyber tactics to destabilize democratic processes. It underscores the need for stronger safeguards and countermeasures to protect elections from external interference and social media exploitation.

STS: Special Telecommunications Service (Serviciul de Telecomunicații Speciale) – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

The declassified document from Romania’s Serviciul de Telecomunicații Speciale (STS) provides a comprehensive analysis of the security, implementation, and functionality of the IT&C infrastructure supporting the electoral process. It emphasizes the measures taken to ensure the integrity and transparency of the voting system, particularly the systems SIMPV (monitoring voter presence) and SICPV (centralizing vote results). Despite public concerns and reports of cyber threats, the report concludes there was no evidence of unauthorized data access, manipulation, or system vulnerabilities affecting the 2024 Presidential Elections.

Key Points

1. IT Infrastructure and Legal Framework

  • SIMPV (Monitoring Voter Presence System) and SICPV (Vote Results Centralization System) were key systems used during the elections.
  • Both systems operated under strict legal guidelines (Laws 115/2015 and 370/2004) and were supported by the STS.
  • The systems functioned to prevent voting fraud, centralize data, and ensure transparency, with functionalities like real-time data aggregation and digital signature validation.

2. Security Measures and Cyber Threats

  • Extensive pre-election measures included:
    • Cybersecurity risk assessments.
    • Secure configurations and encrypted data transfers.
    • Blockchain technology for data traceability and integrity.
  • Multiple cyberattacks, including DDoS, were successfully mitigated without affecting system functionality.
  • The infrastructure, including the static public site (prezenta.roaep.ro), remained operational and secure throughout the election.

3. Blockchain Implementation

  • Blockchain was employed to enhance resilience and transparency, ensuring data integrity by anchoring digital signatures into the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI).

4. Operational Performance

  • The systems supported over 19,000 voting sections, processing voter data securely and efficiently.
  • All processes adhered to legal guidelines, with no system downtimes or performance anomalies reported.
  • Real-time publishing of election results ensured transparency, with electronic and paper records cross-validated for accuracy.

5. Independent Validation

  • Observers, civil society representatives, and political entities reported no issues with the systems.
  • Any potential concerns about data alteration could be verified against blockchain records and physical paper documentation.

6. Conclusion

  • The systems achieved their objectives of ensuring secure, transparent, and traceable election processes.
  • The STS fulfilled its role as a cybersecurity authority, effectively countering threats and maintaining operational integrity throughout the election period.

This report underscores the robustness of Romania’s electoral IT infrastructure and highlights the proactive measures taken to safeguard democratic processes against cyber threats and manipulation.

Link to original documents

https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/comunicat-de-presa1733327193


Romania’s Presidential Elections, Press Statement, The USA Government

What Happens in Vegas – Film Set Locations

These locations are for the movie “What Happens in Vegas” 2008
IMDB link to movie

1. 9:25 – Planet Hollywood Hotel and Casino Las Vegas
See 100+ photos inside a movie created by Artificial Intelligence application BrianAI.com with searching and finding my personal photos of Planet Hollywood

2. 10:05 First Bedroom – Issue = The scene starts with a clear window (probably towards Caesars Palace, as I identify from the red and yellow light that I have on my 100+ photos) and during the fight, we have white curtains on the window. The scenes were filmed at different times.
Just remember that is a Caesar Palace View bedroom and probably a Bellagio lake view
Late in the scene, the Caesar red brand is out, probably another cut with a different position of curtains and draperies
bedroom-ph-6cb353b9-230d-4430-a18b-564c3a559cd22c94117e-e980-4e12-bd09-e0190461ae66_Hip Room@500px

3. 13:15 Limousine trip on The Strip starts from Ballys towards The Venetian and return to Bellagio Fountain
Video with the Strip view around Planet Hollyood as seen from a nearby huge terace of Cosmopolitan Hotel and Casino

4. 14:35 – Terrace at 14:36 is at Omnia Nightclub inside Caesar Palace Hotel and Casino
You can see Flamingo hotel on the left, Ballys and Paris Hotel in Front
Meanwhile a new hotel was build behind their heads (between Flamingo and Bally’s), in 2013 – Cromwell Hotel and Casino (instead of Barbary Coast and Bill’s Gamblin’ Hall and Saloon)
Omnia NightClub 11094782_627145160749545_5355548037311769117_o

5. 15:49 Looks like the Palms Pool and Beach Casino
Palms pool and casino
Las-Vegas-palms-dayclub-poolparty

6. 16:08 and many more scenes later (16:56 …) – Rain Nightclub at Palms Casino (closed now)
These nightclubs have frequent facelifts but the main characteristics can be identified
The most interesting is the simulation of rain on glass walls and red light or Rio Casino, near by (during the movie).
Rain_20Nightclub_550_2010-23-12.0

7. 17:45 – Penthouse at Planet Hollywood baby – You can see Paris Hotel and Eiffel Tower from the window (read “many windows” 🙂 ).
planet_hollywood_panorama
Bird eye view video from above Las Vegas from High Roller Las Vegas (at 800 meters from the Penthouse) – night view

Day view – Bird eye view video from above Las Vegas from High Roller Las Vegas (at 800 meters from the Penthouse)

8. 18:38 Eat at Planet Dailies at Planet Hollywood, See “The Ultimate Coffee Shop” branding and the Restaurant name on the table triunghiular menu
planet Dailies coffee shop and food 2e877305499a350f465234423760d383

15. 100+ videos playlist from Las Vegas

Donald Trump positive for Covid-19

trump_covid_Screenshot_20201002_082600_com.instagram.android

Unfortunately, the campaign is a great risk for anybody including Donald J. Trump
He should postpone it towards 2021 as we wrote times and times again about elections in any country (Macron was the first to let them go on and this is not a way we should act during biological wars)
Campaigns should be stoped in all countries.
Fears to lose the Waves of Power is a friend of #Covid19 and its main driver of replication. What about stopping groups of over 10 persons and fill stadiums for elections? Do politicians heard of Sevres, or they have hidden agendas and different measuring units for public and personal projects?
This time Momentum worked against Donald J. Trump and his family.

Thank you for fighting with #Covid19 for us, for hospitals, ventilators, masks, tests, and pushing for fast vaccine research with tons of cash and laws. I took Hydroxychloroquine (Palquenil 200g) and Klacid for 3 days at your advice.
See you healthy in 5 days!

2020-10-02-usa cases
See more WorldOMeters charts on this link WorldOMeters Charts

Stay home!
So you like Virtual seminars?
1. Did you notice that you received a life without a user manual?
Did you notice that you received a brain without a user manual?
Let’s create these missing Documentation
Discover your Virtual Unleash the Power Within 2020 experience for October
UPW in your livingroom reservation

Something BIG is coming for you…
Tony Robbins has created something BIG exclusively for you! Unleash the Power Within Virtual is coming to you, right in the comforts of your home!
Get your ticket for a 3 days super concert from your living room, with all your family
Discover your Virtual Unleash the Power Within 2020 experience for October on this link
16 minutes of secret previews from the previous 2 virtual events in August and September and some surprises from UPW live events

Enjoy!

Do you like to travel?
2. Travel virtually to Brazil Carnivals with more than 20 hours of youtube movies on these playlists (2020 and 2019 Brazil Carnaval parties)
The most beautiful ballerinas of Brazil Carnaval Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo playlist
Top Beauty Carnaval Dancers
28+ videos of 2020 Rio Carnaval Samba Brasil Playlist – come back often to see updates
28+ Carnaval videos
More videos from Rio Carnaval 2020 and 2019 on this playlist
More Carnaval videos

Do you like to read?
3. Stay home and travel virtually using your Kindle
Free sample pages for 50+ Visual Bilingual Dictionaries on Amazon Kindle
As the first pages are free to read you will probably learn some nice stuff (and if you have Kindle Unlimited subscription you can read them all, as you do on Netflix, at no extra cost)
(Kindle app free and is working on Android, Apple iOS, Windows)
Amazon link to 50 Books

Author Palooza Virtual Seminar with Gerry Robert started today in a super Zoom session

I am waiting for two more days of top content!
I remembered that the first time he came to Romania at JW Mariott Grand Hotel Bucharest a large crowd of people could not get into the seminar room because they got there 10 minutes too late.
Learn more, make a reservation, and write a book on this link http://book.funnels.win

Now, with Covid-19, the rooms for bigger and bigger – because they are virtual – reserve your seat!
Today I learned to focus on the words WIDE and SISTER as a secret mantra to get out of me limiting beliefs when writing books (I matched my long time questions with the course content and figured out what happened in my brain)
#Author2020

m8-luxor

Author Palooza Virtual Seminar with Gerry Robert had its second day of top content!
I made my first steps toward my next book. This 50+ book list resulted after my other seminars with Gerry Robert
Videnda AI Books
#Author2020

m7-eiffel
Learn more, make a reservation, and write a book on this link http://book.funnels.win

Python program that can solve Tensorflow-GPU, CUDA, cudnn error

For the error described below, you will receive a downloadable Python file and technical support on email
If you want to solve the following Tensorflow, Cuda, Cudnn error
Download our solution (python file) and technical support by email
The Python program is on this link Python Program for Tensorflow-GPU

If you do not have a GPU board on your PC do not buy this product – Nvidia and CUDA and CUDNN do not work for you

The output of the Python program is (we will help you get to this result on your PC)

tensorflow version 2.3.0
————–GPU—————————–
GPU b’GPU 0: GeForce MX130 (UUID: GPU-4110fa0e-65db-5dc8-83ab-9d6b9bab212d)\r\n’
GPU b’name, memory.total [MiB]\r\nGeForce MX130, 2048 MiB\r\n’

The Error message is

2020-08-09 22:39:37.802863: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘cudart64_101.dll’; dlerror: cudart64_101.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:37.815730: I tensorflow/stream_executor/cuda/cudart_stub.cc:29] Ignore above cudart dlerror if you do not have a GPU set up on your machine.
2020-08-09 22:39:40.977308: I tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:48] Successfully opened dynamic library nvcuda.dll
2020-08-09 22:39:41.368091: I tensorflow/core/common_runtime/gpu/gpu_device.cc:1716] Found device 0 with properties:
pciBusID: 0000:01:00.0 name: GeForce MX130 computeCapability: 5.0
coreClock: 1.189GHz coreCount: 3 deviceMemorySize: 2.00GiB deviceMemoryBandwidth: 37.33GiB/s
2020-08-09 22:39:41.390909: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘cudart64_101.dll’; dlerror: cudart64_101.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:41.417424: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘cublas64_10.dll’; dlerror: cublas64_10.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:41.433415: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘cufft64_10.dll’; dlerror: cufft64_10.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:41.448755: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘curand64_10.dll’; dlerror: curand64_10.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:41.468271: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘cusolver64_10.dll’; dlerror: cusolver64_10.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:41.489726: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘cusparse64_10.dll’; dlerror: cusparse64_10.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:41.521800: W tensorflow/stream_executor/platform/default/dso_loader.cc:59] Could not load dynamic library ‘cudnn64_7.dll’; dlerror: cudnn64_7.dll not found
2020-08-09 22:39:41.550799: W tensorflow/core/common_runtime/gpu/gpu_device.cc:1753] Cannot dlopen some GPU libraries. Please make sure the missing libraries mentioned above are installed properly if you would like to use GPU. Follow the guide at https://www.tensorflow.org/install/gpu for how to download and setup the required libraries for your platform.
Skipping registering GPU devices…

Visual Bilingual Dictionaries with Audio and Video

Easy to Learn Foreign Languages
Playlist with all audio and video materials for Bilingual Visual Dictionaries

Travel into a virtual world and learn a new language on the road (Visual Dictionaries)
The Images were collected in the last 10 years during our travels. They are organized and labeled using Artificial Intelligence and offered to you as a virtual travel assistant that will teach you new words in new languages.
The book was written to help you understand better, the cities you are going to travel to.

collage-small2
Link to all the Visual Dictionaires on Amazon Kindle

cover-english-portuguese-v1.5-small1
English Portuguese Bilingual Visual Dictionary from Brain AI

cover-english-spanish-v1.2-small1
English to Spanish, Visual Dictionary from Brian AI

cover-english-romanian-v1.3-small
Visual Dictionary Romanian English from Brian AI

cover-portuguese-spanish-small-v1.3.3
Dicionário Visual Português Espanhol de Brain AI

This page will contain links to Visual Bilingual Dictionaries (in the next 24 hours)

Stubhub sold me tickets at a concert where I am not allowed to enter

I haven’t such a bad “romantic” experience since the visit to The Hassan II Mosque is in Casablanca, Morocco. At the entry of the mosque they asked me to split from my wife, as men are allowed in the main room and women should go in a room in the back of another building. I refused the offer and the whole romantic perfume of the Hollywood movie Casablanca vanished. Now let’s talk about what’s left of roberto carlo’s romantic tunes …

The show is named “roberto carlos só para mulheres” and is declared by Eventim “público geral são paulo”.
robert-carlos
I am not a Portuguese speaker but Roberto is not the first singer that sings for woman. I though that the title is about an album or a song. Now I know better. The title was about not letting any man entering the concert !
Eventim, Stubhub and Espaço das Américas did not know how to deal with that
Eventim added “público geral são paulo” to their advertising.
Stubhub kept their warning about “tickets only for students” and “tickets for people with disabilities”, but the fact that all their tickets where for woman did not appear anywhere on their platform.
Stubhub technical support was taking by storm and answered “this information was mentioned once you purchased the tickets: Roberto Carlos Só Para Mulheres São Paulo”. Well the correct answer is “before you purchased the ticket“.

Espaço das Américas asked for super prices for parking on event days. 50R$ instead of 10R$. I told them that I have to leave the event because I am not allowed to enter the concert area and they could not give me back the money, also. They argued that there is no free time in their parking menu. The area is full with show arenas and the parking business is thriving at 3 times the prices of Avenida Paulista. There is no time for customer care here. Business is thriving and police work hard to let hundreds of cars get in and out the area every weekend.

There where more husbands there, trying to sell the tickets. I asked at the cashier and they send me at the entry of the concert area to do the sale process. I looked at the old woman that where approaching me. There is no way these respectable women will come in this part of town without a ticket. I went to a market near by and all the women already had tickets. Some young women laugh about my Roberto Carlos offer (but the Sao Paulo super arena was fully packed at Ed Sheeran :-), a different romantic era ). So my best offer was to find some woman that have no means of getting to the concert. I saw them sharing some strange cheap food at a terrace with plastic tables. I will never forget the light in their eyes when I show them the tickets. They could not believe that they may won the tickets. The waiter realized the confusion and explain them in Portuguese that the “gentlemen” is not allowed at the concert. For 30 seconds I was “o senhor”.

I froze my shopping at Stubhub until I will reconstruct my romantic soul back. Maybe I will try the Viagogo site again (this is a different story – I’ll be back with more details).

Dorin, ex romantic, ex eager to learn about Roberto Carlos with the help of Stubhub and Eventim

I only have “beep” words for this experience. Let’s focus on the wonderfull thing, that some ladys may have stand up in the concert arena with tears in their eyes (like I saw at the MGM Grand Arena, when Neil Diamond sang Sweet Caroline :-))

“This is an island babe, If you do not bring it here, you will not find it here” Harrison Ford in the video bellow

Dorin