Comprehensive Review and Analysis of COVID-19 Response: Lessons Learned and Future Strategies


Summary and Key Points

The document addresses several myths and misconceptions surrounding COVID-19, vaccines, and public health measures. It combines personal anecdotes, data, and opinions to refute these myths while offering a critical perspective on societal responses to the pandemic.
See also a link to the officially released report = COVID Select Concludes 2-Year Investigation, Issues 500+ Page Final Report on Lessons Learned and the Path Forward (Selected USA Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic concluded its two-year investigation into the COVID-19 pandemic and released a final report titled “After Action Review of the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Lessons Learned and a Path Forward.”)


Key Points by Myth:

1. Social Distancing Works

  • Social distancing is effective against viruses, as evidenced by educational campaigns in Italy. However, panic and misinformation undermined its implementation in other places.
  • Criticism of public health policies often ignores the lack of public education on viruses and vaccines.

2. Masks are Effective

  • Masks reduce virus transmission, even if they don’t block 100%.
  • Personal protective equipment like masks serves multiple purposes, including air filtration in polluted environments.

3. Lockdowns and Mental Health

  • Lockdowns had varied psychological impacts. The author argues that social adaptation and personal preparedness can mitigate trauma.
  • Opportunities like virtual learning and events (e.g., Tony Robbins seminars) emerged during lockdowns.

4. Vaccines Slowed the Virus Spread

  • Vaccines are vital for public health, as demonstrated historically by increased life expectancy.
  • The creation and deployment of COVID-19 vaccines involved complex logistics and global coordination.

5. Political Influence on Vaccine Approval

  • Vaccine approval processes were expedited during the pandemic, with political pressure playing a role (e.g., Donald Trump’s efforts).
  • Skepticism toward pharmaceutical companies is common but often ignores the critical role of vaccines in saving lives.

6. School Closures

  • The closure of schools had negative impacts, particularly on mental health and education systems.
  • Despite these challenges, online learning systems were rapidly implemented, and technology-enabled global education initiatives.

7. Vaccine Side Effects

  • Side effects are often due to pre-existing conditions or improper screening before vaccination, not the vaccines themselves.
  • Medications are statistically far more likely to cause adverse reactions than vaccines.

Broader Themes and Critiques:

  • Misinformation and Media Panic: The media’s tendency to sensationalize issues fueled public panic rather than providing clear guidance.
  • Education Deficiencies: A lack of public understanding about science and health systems exacerbates vaccine hesitancy and distrust in public health measures.
  • The Role of Leadership: Both political and scientific leaders influenced public perception and vaccine rollout success, though often with mixed results.
  • Value of Learning: Emphasis on education as the key to combating ignorance and ensuring societal progress.

Takeaways:

  1. Public health measures like masks, social distancing, and vaccines are scientifically supported and crucial during pandemics.
  2. The effectiveness of these measures is often undermined by misinformation, poor public education, and media sensationalism.
  3. Preparation, adaptability, and education are vital for managing crises like COVID-19 effectively.
  4. Trust in science and informed decision-making are necessary to combat future health challenges.

Details

Myth = 3. Social distancing measures were arbitrary and not based on science
Social distancing works against viruses. On Italian television, there were series with biologists and virologists explaining from scratch what viruses and vaccines are, and people understood what to do. They followed all the distancing rules and the lines drawn on the asphalt and in stores. Here, there was only panic and batches of vaccines seized. Okay, there were exceptions, like those chasing me on the street shouting “Bastardo,” questioning why I wore a mask and didn’t shake their hands.
Then there was a scandal because the Ministry of Health ordered many vaccines. Well, that was its duty. How could they know the education system was in shambles, most people had no idea what viruses were, and they read reports like this one, written by others who exploit ignorance to make money with nonsense? How could they know that television, in the race for ratings, would do what all TV stations worldwide are tempted to do—spread PANIC?
Paradoxically and ironically, the same TV stations now criticize the Ministry of Health (with reports, tables, and sensational figures … “You have no idea what you’re losing,” “Breaking News”)—how stupid.

Myth = 4. There is no conclusive evidence that wearing masks prevented the spread of COVID-19
Masks work. Perhaps they mean that masks don’t block 100%.
Those who don’t believe this should try spray-painting cars without a mask.
I still use professional masks like PP2 (or whatever they’re called, there are various grades and two comparison systems) for unblocking toilets in basements or at neighbors’ homes who ruin the whole villa with their mess, or for cleaning glasses with strange chemical sprays.
Even wearing a mask alone in the car works because car filters are not designed for viruses (not necessary on highways, but if you’re driving at 5 km/h through northern Paris among street vendors lining kilometers of sidewalks…). Next time you point fingers at an elderly person wearing a mask alone in their car … you’re the blonde (fool).


What Did Not Work in the Masks at the Wuhan Military Laboratory?

The real question is this: What failed in the masks used at the Wuhan military laboratory? And most importantly, how can we improve masks to prevent similar failures in the future?

This topic reminds me of a striking image: the special protective suit and mask worn by Vladimir Putin when he entered a biological military laboratory. The footage aired at the time, showcasing an intense moment. Strangely enough, during that critical period, both China and Russia were the first to land planes and laboratories in Italy, offering immediate help, while the European Union was still locked in endless discussions. As the EU talked and talked, Italy faced increasing devastation, with more and more lives lost.

Ironically, the Big Bosses of the EU, many of whom have medicine diplomas according to their CVs, seemed paralyzed in action while Italy was dying. Meanwhile, the global narrative focused on painting Trump with “funny labels” rather than questioning the EU leadership’s delayed response.

Eventually, the EU stepped up, organized, and delivered the vaccine—a milestone that deserves credit. And yes, I took four doses of it, appreciating the results. However, the lessons remain: rapid action, decisive leadership, and technological improvement, such as better mask designs, are essential to preventing such disasters in the future.


Myth = 5. The effects of lockdowns were mostly mental and psychological trauma for the population, especially the youth
I was dropped into cities where I didn’t know the language for very long periods, and I suffered no trauma.
On the contrary, more social opportunities arose, like tons of courses, including a 5-day one with Tony Robbins, attended by 25,000 people online, displayed live on giant monitors in a super studio specially built during COVID.
I was prepared for these traumas—on my first flights, I only thought about chess player Fischer, who isolated himself before championships (or maybe I just convinced myself it was possible to cope), and the person who barricaded himself to make manifestos—if you remember that movie. What actually happened? I didn’t have five free minutes. So, traumas arise in those predisposed to them, repeating endlessly, “Now I have trauma. If I look out the window, I’ll feel traumatized. Let me look out the window now” (Don’t try this at home; it’s a negative example).

Myth = 6. There is no evidence that COVID vaccines stopped or slowed the spread of the virus
I’ve reached 60 years of age thanks to vaccines. Check how long our ancestors lived before vaccines. Learn how vaccines are made and why the inventor tested it on himself without reading reports.

Myth = 7. The Biden administration pressured the FDA to approve vaccines, even though several FDA-affiliated scientists opposed it
Donald J. Trump led the creation of the vaccine and pressured the FDA to approve it faster. The vaccine was deliberately delayed to be released three days after the election (Georgescu’s tricks in the USA).
There were endless meetings and press conferences, lasting months. But if you believed all the labels attached to Trump, you didn’t follow how the vaccine was created. I would go to the pharmacy on the ground floor of my building and buy whatever was discussed in meetings hours before doctors and pharmacists in Italy woke up and emptied the stock.
Biden didn’t do much here—as you may have noticed, he has simpler issues to handle—and was inaugurated three months after the vaccine appeared (launched three days post-election—another scam like Georgescu).
Trump implemented military measures to convert factories into ventilator production (like Putin now with armaments) and vaccines. He squeezed Big Pharma in endless meetings. Now, books claim Big Pharma charged $10 per vaccine instead of $1. The truth is, if I had come to your door with a $100 vaccine, you would have paid it and been indebted to me for life, greeting me from the end of the street. After the war, all kinds of opportunists come out to sell us reports. He negotiated everything he could.
But the real heroes were people like Bill Gates, who built factories before the vaccine even existed or was approved (super idea!). After realizing no one understood what he was doing, he recently started frequent blogs and videos on 1,000 topics, hoping we might understand something. An employee in a Netflix documentary about him said, “He goes to meetings where he knows ten times more than everyone else in the room—I don’t really understand why he attends.”


Myth = 8. There was no scientific support for closing schools. It had multiple negative effects. Suicide attempts among girls aged 12-17 increased by 51%.
I carried tons of servers and electronic lessons to schools all over Romania long before COVID. I conducted week-long training sessions with inspectors across the country, teaching them to create electronic lessons and lead their counties to do the same. I personally ensured that every one of them completed their work. No one left without generating electronic lessons covering all possible components. Paradoxically, when COVID began, kids worldwide launched new online education systems from scratch in record time.
Look now on YouTube—so many AI super-gurus publish free courses (people earning millions of dollars share knowledge for free on YouTube). You’d need 500 years to learn it all. It’s not lessons or teachers that are missing.
But if you remove Physics from exams and replace it with Religion, students dance on desks, stab teachers, and drug dealers’ mothers expel police from schools because “the poor boy was stressed,” it’s no wonder the education system is now on its knees, sinking in a swamp. No wonder 50% of vaccines go to waste.
At the vaccination center in Brașov (since I couldn’t get an appointment in Bucharest), I talked more than all the doctors there combined. On my way out, I noticed that the vaccine batch was the one seized in Italy two days earlier, which was all over the news. Televisions stressed out all the doctors in Romania and saw people with two university degrees hesitate before the nonsense spread on TV and online (Georgescu wasn’t the first “black hole” in rational thought). How is it possible that I talked more than all the doctors in a vaccination unit? They all stared at the ground.
At another vaccine center, a doctor told us to sign a document saying the vaccine had expired. I, along with two Chinese people, signed it. What could possibly expire in a few months in a vaccine? If it was launched out of sequence to prevent deaths before approval, it’s normal for the expiration date to be approximate. It doesn’t have five years of tests to determine the exact expiry date.
I’ve had 16 vaccines so far because I spent an extended period in Brazil, and some are mandatory (they refuse you at customs without them—random checks). I had something like three injections in one arm, a 20-minute break, then three in the other arm…
I look in disbelief at people who still read all kinds of reports and refuse to vaccinate.

Myth = Side Effects
Yes, I’ve studied this super myth that scares everyone:

  1. No pre-vaccine testing is conducted. You fill out a declaration, and some people lie in their answers (e.g., “Do you have a cough, throat irritation, chills…?”). Those who already have COVID lie or don’t yet show symptoms (you’ve traveled a ton of kilometers to get a vaccine, and now you’re going to check the “wrong” boxes on the form—clearly, they’ll send you home—or they’ll test you, and you’ll have to return in three days). These are the ones with side effects (it can be verified that the reported side effects align with COVID symptoms and effects). But if you don’t verify, you’ll fall for scammers selling books (including Kennedy). Now Kennedy is big in the Trump Administration for NAME and VOTES. Otherwise, Trump wore gloves even when young, is obsessed with viruses, and doesn’t eat after shaking hands (even with waiters). This means he’s carried virus-related questions all his life and may know more than the conmen labeling him and publishing “unproven” reports.
    Think about how much you know compared to others due to the peculiar questions you’ve carried with you.
  2. A medication is 1,000 times more dangerous than a vaccine. But if people don’t know how medications and vaccines are made, they believe the stories about Kennedy and Big Pharma… Those with allergies, adverse effects, or secondary reactions to medications know better—they didn’t experience those from vaccines but from a narrow set of medications that don’t match their DNA, body, other medications, or existing conditions or weaknesses.

So, if someone asks whether it’s useful to pay attention in school, learn everything, follow the curriculum and more, and read lots of books, you can respond:

  • If you don’t learn, you’ll die!
    Teachers are free medicine—when a teacher tells you to read a book, you should read two!
    (You probably already know friends or relatives you didn’t advise during COVID… and who are no longer with us.)

The document ends here, but I still want to learn. No problem.
Link to Google Doc


The original US Report is described here
https://oversight.house.gov/release/final-report-covid-select-concludes-2-year-investigation-issues-500-page-final-report-on-lessons-learned-and-the-path-forward

CCR Anulează Alegerile Prezidențiale din 2024 din Cauza Manipulărilor Digitale și a Neregulilor Majore

Motivarea deciziei Curții Constituționale a României (CCR) din 6 decembrie 2024 explică detaliat anularea procesului electoral prezidențial din cauza unor neregularități majore care au afectat caracterul liber, corect și transparent al alegerilor. Iată principalele aspecte din motivare:

Motivele anulării alegerilor:

  1. Manipularea votului și dezinformarea alegătorilor:
    • Alegătorii au fost influențați prin campanii de dezinformare organizate, derulate pe platformele digitale și prin utilizarea algoritmilor platformelor de social-media în mod netransparent.
    • Un candidat a beneficiat de promovare agresivă și tratament preferențial, eludând reglementările electorale.
  2. Încălcarea legislației privind finanțarea campaniei electorale:
    • Un candidat a declarat un buget de campanie de „0 lei”, în contradicție cu amploarea vizibilă a campaniei desfășurate.
    • Finanțarea netransparentă și nedeclarată a afectat egalitatea de șanse între candidați.
  3. Afectarea egalității de șanse:
    • Candidații adversari au fost dezavantajați de expunerea disproporționată a unui candidat pe rețelele sociale, creând un dezechilibru evident.
  4. Atacuri cibernetice:
    • Documentele declasificate de Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării (CSAT) indică atacuri cibernetice asupra infrastructurii IT&C care susține procesul electoral.

Consecințe și măsuri:

  1. Anularea procesului electoral:
    • Toate operațiunile electorale desfășurate în baza hotărârilor guvernamentale privind alegerile prezidențiale au fost declarate nule.
  2. Reluarea alegerilor:
    • Guvernul trebuie să stabilească o nouă dată pentru alegeri și să elaboreze un nou program electoral care să asigure respectarea principiilor democratice și constituționale.
  3. Prelungirea mandatului președintelui în funcție:
    • Conform Constituției, președintele actual își va exercita mandatul până la depunerea jurământului de către noul președinte ales.

Semnificație:

Această decizie istorică reflectă angajamentul CCR de a proteja integritatea democratică a procesului electoral, subliniind importanța unui cadru electoral transparent, corect și imun la influențele externe. De asemenea, reafirmă necesitatea combaterii manipulărilor digitale și a dezinformării în era modernă.

Descarcă documentul original ce conține Motivarea CCR

Din documentele declasificate de CSAT reiese o serie de informații importante despre interferențele externe și atacurile cibernetice care au vizat procesul electoral din România. Conform rapoartelor furnizate de mai multe instituții de securitate (MAI, SRI, SIE, STS), există indicii clare că Rusia, posibil în colaborare cu alte entități, inclusiv China și platforma TikTok, a orchestrat campanii de influență și atacuri cibernetice pentru a favoriza un candidat specific, anti-NATO și pro-Rusia.

Puncte cheie din rapoarte:

  1. Manipularea pe TikTok:
    • Campanii masive, coordonate, au fost derulate pe TikTok pentru promovarea candidatului Călin Georgescu, care a beneficiat de o creștere semnificativă a notorietății în ultimele săptămâni înainte de alegeri.
    • Au fost identificați influenceri plătiți și rețele de conturi false care au promovat mesaje pro-Georgescu și pro-Rusia, utilizând hashtag-uri și mesaje predefinite.
  2. Atacuri cibernetice asupra infrastructurii electorale:
    • Infrastructura IT&C a fost ținta a peste 85.000 de atacuri cibernetice, utilizând tehnici avansate (SQL Injection, Cross-Site Scripting etc.). Sistemele SIMPV și SICPV gestionate de STS au fost vizate pentru alterarea datelor și crearea de breșe.
    • Credentialele platformelor oficiale de monitorizare a votului au fost exfiltrate și distribuite pe platforme de criminalitate cibernetică.
  3. Campanii de influență coordonate de Rusia:
    • Rapoartele menționează utilizarea tacticilor de dezinformare, propagandă, deepfake-uri, și manipularea opiniei publice prin mesaje divizive și pro-Kremlin. Rusia a vizat candidați eurosceptici și anti-NATO, utilizând resurse semnificative și tehnologii avansate, inclusiv inteligență artificială.
  4. Posibilă colaborare cu entități chineze:
    • Deși nu există dovezi clare în documentele analizate, implicarea TikTok, platformă cu legături la entități chineze, sugerează o posibilă colaborare în derularea campaniilor de influență.

Concluzii:

Decizia CCR de anulare a alegerilor și organizarea unui nou scrutin reflectă gravitatea situației. Atacurile cibernetice și campaniile de influență reprezintă un risc major pentru securitatea națională, iar măsurile luate subliniază necesitatea unei abordări ferme și coordonate pentru protejarea democrației și a suveranității țării.

Link către documentele originale CSAT

Statele Unite și-au exprimat îngrijorarea cu privire la posibila interferență în alegerile prezidențiale din România, în urma dezvăluirilor Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării (CSAT) despre atacuri cibernetice agresive de tip hibrid atribuite Rusiei. Aceste atacuri au vizat influențarea integrității procesului electoral românesc.

Departamentul de Stat al SUA a subliniat importanța investigării complete a datelor menționate în raportul CSAT pentru a asigura integritatea alegerilor din România. De asemenea, a reafirmat încrederea în instituțiile democratice românești și în capacitatea acestora de a gestiona astfel de influențe externe.

În plus, Statele Unite au avertizat că orice schimbare în politica externă a României, care ar îndepărta țara de alianțele occidentale, ar putea avea consecințe negative asupra cooperării în domeniul securității și ar descuraja investițiile americane în România.

Aceste declarații vin în contextul anulării de către Curtea Constituțională a alegerilor prezidențiale din România, pe fondul acuzațiilor de interferență rusă și manipulare a platformei TikTok în favoarea unui candidat pro-rus.


https://ro.usembassy.gov/romania-presidential-elections/

https://www.state.gov/statement-on-romanias-presidential-elections

Rapoarte declasificate privind alegerile prezidențiale din România – 2024: Informații despre securitatea cibernetică, manipularea rețelelor sociale și interferențele geopolitice


O analiză cuprinzătoare a rapoartelor declasificate care detaliază manipularea rețelelor sociale, atacurile cibernetice, influența rusă și provocările instituționale care afectează alegerile din România, evidențiind tacticile cheie, vulnerabilitățile și implicațiile geopolitice mai largi.
 
Documente declasificate privind alegerile din România

Rezumat
Documentele declasificate oferă o imagine de ansamblu detaliată a strategiilor coordonate, actorilor și vulnerabilităților exploatate în timpul alegerilor prezidențiale din România din 2024. Ei descoperă o operațiune hibridă care implică atacuri cibernetice, manipulare a rețelelor sociale și campanii de propagandă. Accentul principal a fost pe amplificarea vizibilității și influenței candidatului Călin Georgescu, folosind în același timp dezinformarea pentru a submina procesele democratice. Descoperirile dezvăluie o interacțiune complexă între operațiunile cibernetice sponsorizate de stat, rețelele interne și internaționale și utilizarea abuzivă strategică a platformelor de socializare precum TikTok.

Puncte cheie
1. Manipularea rețelelor sociale (campanii centrate pe TikTok)
Recrutarea influencerilor: Peste 100 de influenceri cu un total de 8 milioane de urmăritori au fost implicați fără să știe în promovarea lui Călin Georgescu prin hashtag-uri coordonate (#echilibrusiverticalitate, #prezidentiale2024).
Campanii nemarcate: TikTok și alte platforme nu au reușit să aplice regulile de etichetare pentru conținutul politic, permițând diseminarea necontrolată a videoclipurilor și narațiunilor.
Tactici replicate: Strategiile de campanie au reflectat îndeaproape operațiunile Rusiei în Ucraina și Moldova, punând accentul pe narațiuni țintite și coordonare ascunsă.
2. Atacuri cibernetice și vulnerabilități ale sistemelor informatice
Infrastructura electorală vizată: Sistemele gestionate de Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă (AEP) și Serviciul Special de Telecomunicații (STS) au fost atacate cu metode sofisticate, cum ar fi SQL Injection și Cross-Site Scripting.
Domeniul de aplicare al atacurilor: Peste 85.000 de atacuri cibernetice din partea entităților din 33 de țări au fost înregistrate în perioada electorală, care vizează furtul de date, compromiterea sistemului și dezinformarea.
3. Influența rusă și războiul hibrid
Obiective strategice:
Promovarea candidaților eurosceptici, pro-ruși și extremiști.
Subminarea credibilității NATO și UE în România.
Amplificarea diviziunilor sociale și erodarea încrederii publice în instituțiile democratice.
Tactici de dezinformare:
Deepfake-uri bazate pe inteligență artificială, imagini falsificate și narațiuni coordonate pe rețelele sociale pentru a răspândi informații controversate și înșelătoare.
Utilizarea fermelor de troli, a influencerilor locali și a canalelor Telegram pentru a evita detectarea și a amplifica mesajele.
4. Implicarea grupurilor extremiste și criminale
Grupurile extremiste interne, ultranaționaliștii și rețelele de crimă organizată au mobilizat resurse pentru a sprijini campania.
Stimulente financiare: Plățile au fost coordonate prin companii fantomă și intermediari, asigurând anonimatul și complicând atribuirea.
5. Provocări instituționale
Eșecuri în aplicarea legii: În ciuda încercărilor autorităților electorale române de a reglementa conținutul online, platforme precum TikTok nu au reușit să se conformeze pe deplin, permițând conținutului neautorizat să prospere.
Riscuri mai largi: Poziția României ca membru NATO și UE a făcut-o o țintă critică pentru războiul hibrid care vizează destabilizarea regiunii.

Concluzie
Documentele atașate evidențiază în mod colectiv vulnerabilitățile din procesele electorale din România și provocările mai largi ale contracarării amenințărilor hibride. Constatările subliniază:
Sofisticarea războiului hibrid:
Operațiunile au implicat o combinație de atacuri cibernetice, manipulare a rețelelor sociale și propagandă, demonstrând evoluția tacticilor de interferență electorală.
Puncte slabe sistemice:
Aplicarea insuficientă a reglementărilor platformei și vulnerabilitățile infrastructurii electorale au creat oportunități de exploatare.
Implicații regionale și globale:
Aceste acțiuni fac parte dintr-un model mai amplu de război hibrid rusesc, care vizează coeziunea NATO și UE, exploatând în același timp slăbiciunile sociale și instituționale din statele membre.
Necesitatea contramăsurilor:
Apărarea consolidată a securității cibernetice, reglementările mai stricte privind rețelele sociale și colaborarea internațională sunt necesare pentru a atenua astfel de amenințări în viitor.
Această analiză cuprinzătoare subliniază nevoia urgentă de a consolida garanțiile democratice și de a contracara strategiile de război hibrid care vizează atât România, cât și regiunea europeană mai largă.
 
 SRI: Serviciul Român de Informații Doc 1 – Raport CSAT declasificat privind alegerile din România


Rezumat
Acest raport detaliază nereguli semnificative și activități suspecte asociate alegerilor prezidențiale din România din 2024, în special în ceea ce privește creșterea rapidă a popularității candidatului Călin Georgescu. Documentul evidențiază utilizarea rețelelor sociale, în special TikTok, pentru a orchestra o campanie coordonată la scară largă, care a folosit algoritmi, influenți și finanțare externă. În ciuda cheltuielilor minime declarate pentru campanie, au fost folosite resurse extinse și strategii sofisticate, ridicând întrebări cu privire la legalitatea și transparența procesului electoral.
Puncte cheie
1. Campania TikTok și creșterea artificială a popularității
Ascensiune rapidă: Călin Georgescu a crescut de la <1% la sfârșitul lunii octombrie 2024 la 22,94% în primul tur al alegerilor, atribuit în mare parte unei campanii TikTok foarte coordonate.
Rețea coordonată: O rețea de 25.000 de conturi TikTok a fost activată cu două săptămâni înainte de alegeri, cu 797 de conturi create inițial în 2016, dar inactive până în noiembrie 2024.
Exploatarea platformei: Algoritmii au fost manipulați prin hashtag-uri (#CG, #diaspora), emoji-uri și conținut pre-proiectat distribuit utilizatorilor prin Telegram.
2. Telegram ca instrument de coordonare
Canalele Telegram precum @propagatorcg oferit instrucțiuni detaliate utilizatorilor cu privire la strategiile de creare și diseminare a conținutului, asigurând postări aliniate cu algoritmii TikTok.
Numărul de membri ai canalului a crescut de la 1.088 la peste 5.000 într-o singură săptămână în perioada electorală.
3. Utilizarea influencerilor
Influencerii TikTok proeminenți l-au susținut pe Georgescu, fie direct, fie subtil, încorporând etichete de campanie în postări altfel neutre.
Mulți influenceri nu au dezvăluit natura plătită a susținerilor lor, încălcând normele de transparență și reglementările electorale.
4. Crearea de conturi de stat false
Mai multe conturi TikTok au pretins în mod fals afilierea la instituții ale statului românesc, cum ar fi SRI (Serviciul Român de Informații), pentru a da credibilitate și a implica sprijin instituțional pentru Georgescu.
5. Mecanisme de finanțare
În ciuda faptului că nu au declarat cheltuieli de campanie, fonduri substanțiale au sprijinit activitățile promoționale:
Utilizatorul TikTok “bogpr” (identificat ca Bogdan Peschir) a donat peste 1 milion de euro, cu plăți verificate de 381.000 de dolari în timpul campaniei.
Plățile către influenceri au fost canalizate prin FameUp și FA Agency, cu oferte de 1.000 de euro per videoclip promoțional.
6. Comportamentul TikTok și încălcările politicii
TikTok a eliminat o parte din conținut legat de campanie în urma solicitărilor oficiale ale României, dar a permis ca o mare parte din acesta să rămână vizibil în România și în străinătate, încălcând legile electorale.
Grupurile de reflecție europene au criticat politicile inadecvate ale TikTok pentru gestionarea dezinformării electorale și riscurile sistemice ale acesteia pentru discursul public.
7. Conexiuni cu entități externe
Potențialele afilieri cu propaganda rusă (de exemplu, rețelele legate de Sputnik) și conexiunile cu entități legate de criptomonede sugerează influențe externe.
Finanțarea campaniei a inclus conexiuni cu entități sud-africane, ridicând întrebări cu privire la implicarea străină.
8. Implicații mai largi
Raportul subliniază problemele sistemice ale TikTok ca platformă pentru manipularea electorală, inclusiv lipsa de aplicare a propriilor politici și transparența în publicitate și partajarea datelor.
Concluzie
Activitățile documentate reflectă o campanie coordonată și intensivă de resurse pentru a crește artificial vizibilitatea și legitimitatea percepută a lui Călin Georgescu, încălcând legile electorale românești și evidențiind vulnerabilitățile platformelor de social media precum TikTok. Aceste constatări necesită reglementări mai stricte și cooperare internațională pentru a aborda interferența electorală în era digitală.

SRI:  Serviciul Român de Informații Doc 2 – Raport CSAT declasificat privind alegerile din România


Rezumat
Acest document evidențiază operațiunile cibernetice sponsorizate de stat care vizează infrastructura electorală românească și eforturile coordonate de a spori popularitatea lui Călin Georgescu pe TikTok în timpul alegerilor prezidențiale din 2024. Descoperă atacuri cibernetice sofisticate care vizează compromiterea sistemelor electorale, tratament preferențial pe platformele de socializare și campanii de marketing digital bine organizate. Rezultatele sugerează implicarea unui actor de stat cu resurse și expertiză semnificative în securitatea cibernetică și influența digitală.

Puncte cheie
1. Atacuri cibernetice asupra infrastructurii electorale
Sisteme vizate: Atacatorii au vizat sisteme electorale critice gestionate de Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă (AEP) și Serviciul Special de Telecomunicații (STS), inclusiv:
GIS Server: Serverul de cartografiere compromis al AEP conectat atât la rețelele interne, cât și la cele externe.
Sisteme de monitorizare a alegerilor: Platforme precum SIMPV, SICPV și prezenta.roaep.ro au fost atacate, cu scopul de a modifica integritatea datelor și de a perturba disponibilitatea.
Metode de atac:
Injecție SQL: Codul rău intenționat a fost injectat în bazele de date pentru a accesa sau manipula datele.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Atacatorii au introdus scripturi rău intenționate în paginile web, afectând alți utilizatori.
Amploare și domeniu de aplicare: Peste 85.000 de atacuri cibernetice au fost lansate, inclusiv în ziua alegerilor și în perioada postelectorală, folosind tehnici de anonimizare în 33 de țări.
Evaluare: Atacurile au prezentat o abordare extrem de organizată, tipică actorilor sponsorizați de stat.

2. Tratamentul preferențial TikTok
Vizibilitate sporită: TikTok nu a marcat conținutul lui Georgescu ca fiind electoral, permițând diseminarea pe scară largă și vizibilitatea semnificativă în comparație cu alți candidați ale căror postări au fost puternic filtrate.
Încălcarea regulilor electorale:
TikTok nu a respectat pe deplin solicitările Autorității Electorale Române (AEP) de a elimina sau bloca materialele de campanie neautorizate.
Materialele de campanie au continuat să circule în România și în străinătate, chiar și după alegeri.
Avertismente timpurii: TikTok a semnalat campania lui Georgescu ca fiind suspectă încă din 2020, dar nu a luat nicio măsură substanțială pentru a-i restricționa activitățile.

3. Campanie digitală coordonată
Strategii sofisticate:
Canalele Telegram și Discord au fost folosite pentru a coordona programele de postare și pentru a evita detectarea pe TikTok.
Campania a evitat fermele de roboți, bazându-se în schimb pe conturi operate de oameni în diferite locații geografice pentru a ocoli detectarea.
Mesajele au fost diseminate printr-o strategie de “roi”, creând iluzia unui sprijin organic.
Expertiză: Campania a demonstrat o înțelegere avansată a algoritmilor și politicilor TikTok, folosindu-le pentru a maximiza impactul.

4. Posibila implicare a actorilor statali
Resurse și tactici:
Operațiunea a utilizat resurse și expertiză extinse, sugerând implicarea unui actor statal sau a unei entități foarte capabile.
Fără amprente digitale legate de dispozitive sau conturi, indicând o planificare și o execuție meticuloasă.
Firmă de marketing: O companie profesionistă de marketing digital a jucat un rol central, complicând și mai mult atribuirea.

5. Implicații mai largi
Implicarea Partidului Suveranist: Campanii similare au fost identificate pentru nou-înființatul Partidul Oamenilor Tineri (POT), care l-a susținut pe Georgescu.
Riscuri sistemice:
Platformele de socializare precum TikTok prezintă riscuri semnificative pentru integritatea electorală din cauza aplicării slabe a propriilor politici și a lipsei de transparență.
Incidentul evidențiază vulnerabilitățile infrastructurii electorale a României și amenințarea tot mai mare a operațiunilor de influență cibernetică.

Concluzie
Documentul subliniază un efort pe mai multe niveluri de a manipula opinia publică și de a perturba procesul electoral din România prin atacuri cibernetice, influență pe rețelele de socializare și campanii de dezinformare bine coordonate. Dovezile sugerează implicarea unui actor statal, ridicând îngrijorări serioase cu privire la securitatea electorală și rolul rețelelor sociale în procesele democratice.


SIE:  Serviciul de Informații Externe – Raport CSAT declasificat privind alegerile din România

Rezumat
Acest document detaliază strategiile de război hibrid ale Rusiei care vizează procesul electoral al României, precum și eforturile sale mai largi de a submina democrațiile occidentale. Acesta evidențiază utilizarea de către Moscova a atacurilor cibernetice, a campaniilor de dezinformare și a manipulării opiniei publice pentru a eroda încrederea în instituțiile democratice, a amplifica diviziunile sociale și a promova candidații pro-ruși sau extremiști. Raportul subliniază complexitatea și sofisticarea crescândă a acestor tactici, cu un accent semnificativ pe utilizarea platformelor de social media și a creării de conținut bazată pe inteligență artificială.

Puncte cheie
1. Strategiile de interferență electorală ale Rusiei
Istoricul implicării: Rusia are o istorie documentată de interferență în alegerile la nivel global, inclusiv în alegerile prezidențiale din SUA din 2016, și continuă să folosească tactici similare în întreaga Europă.
Obiective:
Erodarea încrederii în instituțiile democratice.
Amplificarea diviziunilor din cadrul societăților.
Susțineți candidații și partidele pro-ruse, naționaliste sau eurosceptice.
Metode:
Studii sociologice pentru identificarea vulnerabilităților opiniei publice și a sistemelor electorale.
Campanii de propagandă agresivă folosind conținut generat de inteligență artificială.
Crearea de narațiuni divizive, care vizează adesea politicile NATO și UE.

2. Tactici de manipulare online
Social Media și AI:
Utilizarea extensivă a platformelor precum Telegram, TikTok, Facebook și VKontakte pentru a disemina propaganda.
Utilizarea instrumentelor AI pentru a produce conținut multimedia de înaltă calitate, inclusiv deepfakes, pentru a induce în eroare și a manipula publicul.
Coordonarea rețelelor de troli și a influencerilor locali pentru a amplifica narațiunile pro-rusești.
Narațiuni țintite:
Discreditați conducerea europeană și NATO.
Promovarea temerilor legate de declinul securității și a instabilității economice.
Subminează sprijinul pentru Ucraina și o portretizează ca pe o forță destabilizatoare.

3. România ca țintă cheie
Amenințare percepută: Rusia vede România ca pe un aliat NATO care îi amenință direct securitatea din cauza găzduirii de active militare americane și a sprijinului său pentru Ucraina.
Acțiuni ostile:
Atacuri cibernetice și scurgeri de informații care vizează infrastructura și sistemele electorale românești.
Narațiuni menite să încurajeze neîncrederea în alianțele NATO și UE.
Afirmații false de ambiții teritoriale împotriva țărilor vecine, cum ar fi Moldova și Ucraina.

4. Campanii de dezinformare
Amplificarea narativă:
Distribuirea de conținut care dezbină prin campanii coordonate.
Utilizarea de imagini și videoclipuri manipulate sau decontextualizate pentru a crea frică și panică.
Grupuri țintă:
Manipularea specifică demografică, concentrându-se în special pe populațiile rurale, religioase și vulnerabile din punct de vedere economic.
Exploatarea nemulțumirilor culturale și sociale pentru a semăna discordie.
Exemple de tehnici:
Postarea încrucișată a propagandei pe mai multe platforme folosind aceeași rețea de conturi.
Asocierea incidentelor false cu refugiații ucraineni sau mișcările de rezistență pentru a submina sprijinul pentru Ucraina.

5. Context geopolitic mai larg
Legătura cu Moldova și Ucraina:
Campaniile paralele de dezinformare din Moldova au avut ca scop destabilizarea guvernelor pro-occidentale.
Eforturile de a eroda solidaritatea europeană față de Ucraina prin promovarea nemulțumirilor sociale și economice în țările NATO.
Propagandă localizată:
Mobilizarea influencerilor locali pentru a promova narațiunile Kremlinului sub masca mișcărilor de bază.

Concluzie
Raportul dezvăluie un efort bine coordonat și intensiv de resurse al Rusiei de a influența alegerile și opinia publică din România, parte a strategiei sale mai ample de subminare a coeziunii NATO și UE. Prin exploatarea progreselor tehnologice și a platformelor de socializare, Rusia încearcă să erodeze stabilitatea democratică, să amplifice diviziunile sociale și să slăbească sprijinul pentru alianțele occidentale. Acest lucru evidențiază nevoia urgentă de contramăsuri solide pentru a aborda amenințările hibride și a proteja procesele democratice.


Ministerul Afacerilor Interne – Raport CSAT declasificat privind alegerile din România

Rezumat
Documentul final subliniază modul în care manipularea rețelelor de socializare, în special prin TikTok, a fost folosită pentru a influența alegerile prezidențiale din România din 2024. Acesta detaliază o campanie caracterizată prin promovarea ascunsă a lui Călin Georgescu folosind influenceri și hashtag-uri coordonate, care oglindesc tacticile văzute în operațiunile rusești din Ucraina. Campania a folosit micro-influenceri și conținut promoțional nemarcat, sugerând o orchestrare externă cu legături cu grupuri extremiste și criminale. Raportul subliniază integrarea manipulării rețelelor sociale cu strategii de război hibrid pentru a destabiliza procesele democratice.

Puncte cheie
1. Utilizarea rețelelor sociale pentru manipularea alegerilor
Exploatarea platformei:


Peste 100 de influenceri cu 8 milioane de urmăritori au fost implicați fără să știe în promovarea lui Călin Georgescu.
Hashtag-urile de campanie precum #echilibrusiverticalitate, #prezidentiale2024 și #unliderpotrivitpentrumine au fost utilizate intens pe TikTok, Instagram și Facebook.
TikTok nu a reușit să implementeze instrucțiunile Biroului Electoral pentru etichetarea conținutului campaniei.
Tactici de campanie:


Influencerii au fost plătiți în funcție de numărul de urmăritori (de exemplu, 390 RON pentru 20.000 de urmăritori).
Mulți influenceri nu știau de promovarea candidatului, ceea ce a dus la reacții publice odată ce campania a fost expusă.

2. Asemănări cu tacticile rusești
Replicarea campaniilor anterioare:


Campania a semănat cu operațiunea Rusiei “Fratele lângă frate” din Ucraina, folosind strategii de coordonare și teme narative identice.
Creatorii de conținut au urmat reguli stricte privind sincronizarea, coloanele sonore, emoji-urile și structurile narative video.
Coordonare sub acoperire:


Campania a implicat metode de a evita detectarea, inclusiv ștergerea tuturor urmelor campaniei online după execuție.

3. Legături cu rețele extremiste și criminale
Actori cheie:


Figuri proeminente asociate cu ideologii extremiste de extremă dreapta, organizații criminale și culte religioase au fost implicate în mobilizarea sprijinului pentru campanie.
Aceste grupuri aveau o istorie de promovare a narațiunilor pro-rusești, antisemite, anti-NATO și anti-Ucraina.
Beneficiarii campaniei:


Campania a fost orchestrată prin intermediari, inclusiv “companii fantomă”, care au coordonat plățile și liniile directoare ale influencerilor.

4. Implicații mai largi
Operațiuni transfrontaliere:


Campanii similare din Moldova și Ucraina dezvăluie un model regional de interferență electorală.
Succesul campaniei din România evidențiază vulnerabilitățile platformelor de social media față de operațiunile de influență sub acoperire.
Erodarea încrederii democratice:


Integrarea elementelor extremiste și a campaniilor de manipulare riscă să submineze încrederea în instituțiile democratice și în procesele electorale.

Concluzie
Raportul oferă dovezi clare ale unei campanii ascunse, bine coordonate, care utilizează rețelele sociale pentru a influența alegerile din România din 2024. Această campanie reflectă o strategie sofisticată aliniată cu practicile de război hibrid, combinând manipularea socială, narațiunile extremiste și tacticile cibernetice pentru a destabiliza procesele democratice. Acesta subliniază necesitatea unor garanții și contramăsuri mai puternice pentru a proteja alegerile de ingerințele externe și de exploatarea rețelelor sociale.
 
STS:  Serviciul de Telecomunicații SpecialeRaport declasificat al CSAT privind alegerile din România


Rezumat
Documentul declasificat de la Serviciul de Telecomunicații Speciale (STS) din România oferă o analiză cuprinzătoare a securității, implementării și funcționalității infrastructurii IT&C care susține procesul electoral. Acesta subliniază măsurile luate pentru a asigura integritatea și transparența sistemului de vot, în special sistemele SIMPV (monitorizarea prezenței alegătorilor) și SICPV (centralizarea rezultatelor votului). În ciuda îngrijorărilor publice și a rapoartelor privind amenințările cibernetice, raportul concluzionează că nu au existat dovezi de acces neautorizat la date, manipulare sau vulnerabilități ale sistemului care să afecteze alegerile prezidențiale din 2024.
Puncte cheie
1. Infrastructura informatică și cadrul juridic
SIMPV (Sistemul de monitorizare a prezenței alegătorilor) și SICPV (Sistemul de centralizare a rezultatelor votului) au fost sisteme cheie utilizate în timpul alegerilor.
Ambele sisteme au funcționat conform unor linii directoare legale stricte (Legile 115/2015 și 370/2004) și au fost susținute de STS.
Sistemele au funcționat pentru a preveni frauda la vot, a centraliza datele și a asigura transparența, cu funcționalități precum agregarea datelor în timp real și validarea semnăturilor digitale.
2. Măsuri de securitate și amenințări cibernetice
Măsurile preelectorale extinse au inclus:
Evaluări ale riscurilor de securitate cibernetică.
Configurații securizate și transferuri de date criptate.
Tehnologia blockchain pentru trasabilitatea și integritatea datelor.
Mai multe atacuri cibernetice, inclusiv DDoS, au fost atenuate cu succes fără a afecta funcționalitatea sistemului.
Infrastructura, inclusiv situl public static (prezenta.roaep.ro), a rămas operațională și sigură pe tot parcursul alegerilor.
3. Implementarea blockchain
Blockchain a fost utilizat pentru a spori reziliența și transparența, asigurând integritatea datelor prin ancorarea semnăturilor digitale în infrastructura europeană de servicii blockchain (EBSI).
4. Performanță operațională
Sistemele au susținut peste 19.000 de secții de vot, procesând datele alegătorilor în siguranță și eficient.
Toate procesele au respectat liniile directoare legale, fără a fi raportate întreruperi ale sistemului sau anomalii de performanță.
Publicarea în timp real a rezultatelor alegerilor a asigurat transparența, cu înregistrări electronice și pe hârtie validate încrucișat pentru acuratețe.
5. Validare independentă
Observatorii, reprezentanții societății civile și entitățile politice nu au raportat probleme cu sistemele.
Orice potențiale îngrijorări cu privire la modificarea datelor ar putea fi verificate în funcție de înregistrările blockchain și documentația fizică pe hârtie.
6. Concluzie
Sistemele și-au atins obiectivele de a asigura procese electorale sigure, transparente și trasabile.
STS și-a îndeplinit rolul de autoritate de securitate cibernetică, contracarând eficient amenințările și menținând integritatea operațională pe toată perioada alegerilor.
Acest raport subliniază robustețea infrastructurii IT electorale a României și evidențiază măsurile proactive luate pentru a proteja procesele democratice împotriva amenințărilor și manipulării cibernetice.
 
 
Link către documentele originale

https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/comunicat-de-presa1733327193
 
 https://ro.usembassy.gov/romania-presidential-elections/
 
 
 

Declassified Reports on Romanian Prezidential Elections – 2024: Insights into Cybersecurity, Social Media Manipulation, and Geopolitical Interference



A comprehensive analysis of declassified reports detailing social media manipulation, cyberattacks, Russian influence, and institutional challenges affecting Romanian elections, highlighting key tactics, vulnerabilities, and broader geopolitical implications.

Summary

The declassified documents provide a detailed overview of the coordinated strategies, actors, and vulnerabilities exploited during Romania’s 2024 presidential elections. They uncover a hybrid operation involving cyberattacks, social media manipulation, and propaganda campaigns. The primary focus was on amplifying the visibility and influence of candidate Călin Georgescu while leveraging disinformation to undermine democratic processes. The findings reveal a complex interplay of state-sponsored cyber operations, domestic and international networks, and the strategic misuse of social media platforms like TikTok.

Key Points

1. Social Media Manipulation (TikTok-Centric Campaigns)

  • Influencer Recruitment: Over 100 influencers with a combined 8 million followers were unknowingly involved in promoting Călin Georgescu through coordinated hashtags (#echilibrusiverticalitate, #prezidentiale2024).
  • Unmarked Campaigns: TikTok and other platforms failed to enforce labeling rules for political content, allowing unchecked dissemination of videos and narratives.
  • Replicated Tactics: Campaign strategies closely mirrored Russia’s operations in Ukraine and Moldova, emphasizing targeted narratives and covert coordination.

2. Cyberattacks and IT System Vulnerabilities

  • Targeted Electoral Infrastructure: Systems managed by the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) and Special Telecommunications Service (STS) were attacked with sophisticated methods like SQL Injection and Cross-Site Scripting.
  • Scope of Attacks: Over 85,000 cyberattacks from entities in 33 countries were recorded during the election period, aimed at data theft, system compromise, and misinformation.

3. Russian Influence and Hybrid Warfare

  • Strategic Objectives:
    • Promote euroskeptic, pro-Russian, and extremist candidates.
    • Undermine NATO and EU credibility within Romania.
    • Amplify societal divisions and erode public trust in democratic institutions.
  • Disinformation Tactics:
    • AI-driven deepfakes, doctored images, and coordinated social media narratives to spread divisive and misleading information.
    • Use of troll farms, local influencers, and Telegram channels to evade detection and amplify messages.

4. Involvement of Extremist and Criminal Groups

  • Key Actors: Domestic extremist groups, ultranationalists, and organized crime networks mobilized resources to support the campaign.
  • Financial Incentives: Payments were coordinated through phantom companies and intermediaries, ensuring anonymity and complicating attribution.

5. Institutional Challenges

  • Failures in Enforcement: Despite attempts by Romanian electoral authorities to regulate online content, platforms like TikTok failed to comply fully, allowing unauthorized content to thrive.
  • Broader Risks: Romania’s position as a NATO and EU member made it a critical target for hybrid warfare aimed at destabilizing the region.

Conclusion

The attached documents collectively highlight the vulnerabilities in Romania’s electoral processes and the broader challenges of countering hybrid threats. The findings emphasize:

  1. Sophistication of Hybrid Warfare:
    • The operations involved a combination of cyberattacks, social media manipulation, and propaganda, demonstrating the evolution of election interference tactics.
  2. Systemic Weaknesses:
    • Insufficient enforcement of platform regulations and vulnerabilities in electoral infrastructure created opportunities for exploitation.
  3. Regional and Global Implications:
    • These actions are part of a larger pattern of Russian hybrid warfare, targeting NATO and EU cohesion while exploiting societal and institutional weaknesses in member states.
  4. Need for Countermeasures:
    • Strengthened cybersecurity defenses, stricter social media regulations, and international collaboration are necessary to mitigate such threats in the future.

This comprehensive analysis underscores the urgent need to bolster democratic safeguards and counter hybrid warfare strategies targeting both Romania and the broader European region.

SRI: Romanian Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informații) Doc 1 – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

This report details significant irregularities and suspicious activities associated with the 2024 Romanian presidential elections, particularly concerning the rapid rise in popularity of candidate Călin Georgescu. The document highlights the use of social media, particularly TikTok, to orchestrate a large-scale, coordinated campaign that leveraged algorithms, influencers, and external financing. Despite minimal declared campaign expenditures, extensive resources and sophisticated strategies were employed, raising questions about the legality and transparency of the election process.

Key Points

1. TikTok Campaign and Artificial Popularity Surge

  • Rapid Ascension: Călin Georgescu rose from <1% support in late October 2024 to 22.94% in the first-round election, largely attributed to a highly coordinated TikTok campaign.
  • Coordinated Network: A network of 25,000 TikTok accounts was activated two weeks before the election, with 797 accounts initially created in 2016 but dormant until November 2024.
  • Platform Exploitation: Algorithms were manipulated through hashtags (#CG, #diaspora), emojis, and pre-designed content distributed to users via Telegram.

2. Telegram as a Coordination Tool

  • Telegram channels like @propagatorcg provided detailed instructions to users on content creation and dissemination strategies, ensuring posts aligned with TikTok’s algorithms.
  • The channel’s membership surged from 1,088 to over 5,000 in a single week during the election period.

3. Use of Influencers

  • Prominent TikTok influencers supported Georgescu, either directly or subtly, embedding campaign tags in otherwise neutral posts.
  • Many influencers did not disclose the paid nature of their endorsements, violating transparency norms and electoral regulations.

4. Creation of Fake State Accounts

  • Several TikTok accounts falsely claimed affiliation with Romanian state institutions, such as the SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service), to lend credibility and imply institutional support for Georgescu.

5. Financing Mechanisms

  • Despite declaring no campaign expenditures, substantial funds supported the promotional activities:
    • The TikTok user “bogpr” (identified as Bogdan Peschir) donated over €1 million, with verified payments of $381,000 during the campaign.
    • Payments to influencers were funneled through FameUp and FA Agency, with offers of €1,000 per promotional video.

6. TikTok’s Conduct and Policy Violations

  • TikTok removed some campaign-related content following official Romanian requests but allowed much of it to remain visible within Romania and abroad, contravening electoral laws.
  • European think tanks criticized TikTok’s inadequate policies for managing electoral disinformation and its systemic risks to public discourse.

7. Connections to External Entities

  • Potential affiliations with Russian propaganda (e.g., Sputnik-linked networks) and connections to cryptocurrency-related entities suggest external influences.
  • The campaign’s financing included connections to South African entities, raising questions about foreign involvement.

8. Broader Implications

  • The report underscores systemic issues with TikTok as a platform for electoral manipulation, including its lack of enforcement of its own policies and transparency in advertising and data sharing.

Conclusion

The documented activities reflect a coordinated and resource-intensive campaign to artificially boost the visibility and perceived legitimacy of Călin Georgescu, violating Romanian electoral laws and highlighting vulnerabilities in social media platforms like TikTok. These findings call for stricter regulations and international cooperation to address electoral interference in the digital age.

SRI: Romanian Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informații) Doc 2 – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

This document highlights state-sponsored cyber operations targeting Romanian electoral infrastructure and coordinated efforts to boost the popularity of Călin Georgescu on TikTok during the 2024 presidential elections. It uncovers sophisticated cyberattacks aimed at compromising election systems, preferential treatment on social media platforms, and well-organized digital marketing campaigns. The findings suggest the involvement of a state actor with significant resources and expertise in cybersecurity and digital influence.


Key Points

1. Cyberattacks on Electoral Infrastructure

  • Targeted Systems: Attackers targeted critical election systems managed by the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) and Special Telecommunications Service (STS), including:
    • GIS Server: AEP’s compromised mapping server connected to both internal and external networks.
    • Election Monitoring Systems: Platforms like SIMPV, SICPV, and prezenta.roaep.ro were attacked, aiming to alter data integrity and disrupt availability.
  • Attack Methods:
    • SQL Injection: Malicious code was injected into databases to access or manipulate data.
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Attackers inserted malicious scripts into web pages, affecting other users.
  • Scale and Scope: Over 85,000 cyberattacks were launched, including during election day and the post-election period, using anonymization techniques across 33 countries.
  • Assessment: The attacks showcased a highly organized approach typical of state-sponsored actors.

2. TikTok’s Preferential Treatment

  • Boosted Visibility: TikTok did not mark Georgescu’s content as electoral, enabling widespread dissemination and significant visibility compared to other candidates whose posts were heavily filtered.
  • Violation of Electoral Rules:
    • TikTok failed to comply fully with the Romanian Electoral Authority’s (AEP) requests to remove or block unauthorized campaign materials.
    • Campaign materials continued to circulate within Romania and internationally, even after the election.
  • Early Warnings: TikTok had flagged Georgescu’s campaign as suspicious as early as 2020 but took no substantial action to restrict its activities.

3. Coordinated Digital Campaign

  • Sophisticated Strategies:
    • Telegram and Discord channels were used to coordinate posting schedules and evade detection on TikTok.
    • The campaign avoided bot farms, instead relying on human-operated accounts across various geolocations to circumvent detection.
    • Messages were disseminated through a “swarming” strategy, creating the illusion of organic support.
  • Expertise: The campaign demonstrated an advanced understanding of TikTok’s algorithms and policies, leveraging these to maximize impact.

4. Possible State Actor Involvement

  • Resources and Tactics:
    • The operation utilized extensive resources and expertise, suggesting involvement from a state actor or a highly capable entity.
    • No digital fingerprints linked devices or accounts, indicating meticulous planning and execution.
  • Marketing Firm: A professional digital marketing company played a central role, further complicating attribution.

5. Broader Implications

  • Sovereignist Party Involvement: Similar campaigns were identified for the newly founded Partidul Oamenilor Tineri (POT), which supported Georgescu.
  • Systemic Risks:
    • Social media platforms like TikTok pose significant risks to electoral integrity due to weak enforcement of their own policies and lack of transparency.
    • The incident highlights vulnerabilities in Romania’s electoral infrastructure and the growing threat of cyber influence operations.

Conclusion

The document underscores a multi-layered effort to manipulate public opinion and disrupt Romania’s electoral process through cyberattacks, social media influence, and well-coordinated disinformation campaigns. The evidence suggests the involvement of a state actor, raising serious concerns about electoral security and the role of social media in democratic processes.

SIE: Foreign Intelligence Service (Serviciul de Informații Externe) – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

This document details Russia’s hybrid warfare strategies targeting Romania’s electoral process, as well as its broader efforts to undermine Western democracies. It highlights Moscow’s use of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and the manipulation of public opinion to erode confidence in democratic institutions, amplify societal divisions, and promote pro-Russian or extremist candidates. The report underscores the increasing complexity and sophistication of these tactics, with a significant focus on leveraging social media platforms and AI-driven content creation.


Key Points

1. Russian Election Interference Strategies

  • History of Involvement: Russia has a documented history of interfering in elections globally, including the U.S. presidential election in 2016, and continues to employ similar tactics across Europe.
  • Goals:
    • Erode trust in democratic institutions.
    • Amplify divisions within societies.
    • Support pro-Russian, nationalist, or euroskeptic candidates and parties.
  • Methods:
    • Sociological studies to identify vulnerabilities in public opinion and electoral systems.
    • Aggressive propaganda campaigns using AI-generated content.
    • Creation of divisive narratives, often targeting NATO and EU policies.

2. Online Manipulation Tactics

  • Social Media and AI:
    • Extensive use of platforms like Telegram, TikTok, Facebook, and VKontakte to disseminate propaganda.
    • Use of AI tools to produce high-quality multimedia content, including deepfakes, to mislead and manipulate audiences.
    • Coordination of troll networks and local influencers to amplify pro-Russian narratives.
  • Targeted Narratives:
    • Discredit European and NATO leadership.
    • Promote fears of declining security and economic instability.
    • Undermine support for Ukraine and portray it as a destabilizing force.

3. Romania as a Key Target

  • Perceived Threat: Russia views Romania as a NATO ally directly threatening its security due to hosting U.S. military assets and its support for Ukraine.
  • Hostile Actions:
    • Cyberattacks and information leaks targeting Romanian infrastructure and electoral systems.
    • Narratives aimed at fostering distrust in NATO and EU alliances.
    • False claims of territorial ambitions against neighboring countries, such as Moldova and Ukraine.

4. Disinformation Campaigns

  • Narrative Amplification:
    • Distribution of divisive content via coordinated campaigns.
    • Use of manipulated or decontextualized images and videos to create fear and panic.
  • Targeted Groups:
    • Demographic-specific manipulation, particularly focusing on rural, religious, and economically vulnerable populations.
    • Exploitation of cultural and societal grievances to sow discord.
  • Example Techniques:
    • Cross-posting propaganda across multiple platforms using the same network of accounts.
    • Associating false incidents with Ukrainian refugees or resistance movements to undermine support for Ukraine.

5. Broader Geopolitical Context

  • Link to Moldova and Ukraine:
    • Parallel disinformation campaigns in Moldova aimed at destabilizing pro-Western governments.
    • Efforts to erode European solidarity for Ukraine by promoting social and economic grievances in NATO countries.
  • Localized Propaganda:
    • Leveraging local influencers to promote Kremlin narratives under the guise of grassroots movements.

Conclusion

The report reveals a well-coordinated and resource-intensive effort by Russia to influence Romanian elections and public opinion, part of its broader strategy to undermine NATO and EU cohesion. By exploiting technological advancements and social media platforms, Russia seeks to erode democratic stability, amplify societal divisions, and weaken support for Western alliances. This highlights the urgent need for robust countermeasures to address hybrid threats and protect democratic processes.

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerul Afacerilor Interne) – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

The final document outlines how social media manipulation, particularly through TikTok, was used to influence Romania’s 2024 presidential elections. It details a campaign characterized by the covert promotion of Călin Georgescu using influencers and coordinated hashtags, which mirrored tactics seen in Russian operations in Ukraine. The campaign leveraged micro-influencers and unmarked promotional content, suggesting external orchestration with ties to extremist and criminal groups. The report underscores the integration of social media manipulation with hybrid warfare strategies to destabilize democratic processes.


Key Points

1. Use of Social Media for Election Manipulation

  • Platform Exploitation:
    • Over 100 influencers with 8 million followers were unknowingly involved in promoting Călin Georgescu.
    • Campaign hashtags such as #echilibrusiverticalitate, #prezidentiale2024, and #unliderpotrivitpentrumine were heavily used across TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook.
    • TikTok failed to implement Electoral Bureau instructions for labeling campaign content.
  • Campaign Tactics:
    • Influencers were paid based on follower counts (e.g., 390 RON for 20,000 followers).
    • Many influencers were unaware of the candidate being promoted, leading to public backlash once the campaign was exposed.

2. Similarities with Russian Tactics

  • Replicating Prior Campaigns:
    • The campaign resembled Russia’s “Brother Beside Brother” operation in Ukraine, using identical coordination strategies and narrative themes.
    • Content creators followed strict guidelines regarding timing, soundtracks, emojis, and video narrative structures.
  • Covert Coordination:
    • The campaign involved methods to evade detection, including deleting all traces of the campaign online after execution.

3. Links to Extremist and Criminal Networks

  • Key Actors:
    • Prominent figures associated with far-right extremist ideologies, criminal organizations, and religious cults were involved in mobilizing support for the campaign.
    • These groups had histories of promoting pro-Russian, antisemitic, anti-NATO, and anti-Ukraine narratives.
  • Campaign Beneficiaries:
    • The campaign was orchestrated through intermediaries, including “phantom companies,” which coordinated influencer payments and guidelines.

4. Broader Implications

  • Cross-Border Operations:
    • Similar campaigns in Moldova and Ukraine reveal a regional pattern of election interference.
    • The Romanian campaign’s success highlights vulnerabilities in social media platforms to covert influence operations.
  • Eroding Democratic Trust:
    • The integration of extremist elements and manipulative campaigns risks undermining trust in democratic institutions and election processes.

Conclusion

The report provides clear evidence of a covert, well-coordinated campaign leveraging social media to influence Romania’s 2024 elections. This campaign reflects a sophisticated strategy aligned with hybrid warfare practices, combining social manipulation, extremist narratives, and cyber tactics to destabilize democratic processes. It underscores the need for stronger safeguards and countermeasures to protect elections from external interference and social media exploitation.

STS: Special Telecommunications Service (Serviciul de Telecomunicații Speciale) – Declassified CSAT Report on Romanian Elections

Summary

The declassified document from Romania’s Serviciul de Telecomunicații Speciale (STS) provides a comprehensive analysis of the security, implementation, and functionality of the IT&C infrastructure supporting the electoral process. It emphasizes the measures taken to ensure the integrity and transparency of the voting system, particularly the systems SIMPV (monitoring voter presence) and SICPV (centralizing vote results). Despite public concerns and reports of cyber threats, the report concludes there was no evidence of unauthorized data access, manipulation, or system vulnerabilities affecting the 2024 Presidential Elections.

Key Points

1. IT Infrastructure and Legal Framework

  • SIMPV (Monitoring Voter Presence System) and SICPV (Vote Results Centralization System) were key systems used during the elections.
  • Both systems operated under strict legal guidelines (Laws 115/2015 and 370/2004) and were supported by the STS.
  • The systems functioned to prevent voting fraud, centralize data, and ensure transparency, with functionalities like real-time data aggregation and digital signature validation.

2. Security Measures and Cyber Threats

  • Extensive pre-election measures included:
    • Cybersecurity risk assessments.
    • Secure configurations and encrypted data transfers.
    • Blockchain technology for data traceability and integrity.
  • Multiple cyberattacks, including DDoS, were successfully mitigated without affecting system functionality.
  • The infrastructure, including the static public site (prezenta.roaep.ro), remained operational and secure throughout the election.

3. Blockchain Implementation

  • Blockchain was employed to enhance resilience and transparency, ensuring data integrity by anchoring digital signatures into the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI).

4. Operational Performance

  • The systems supported over 19,000 voting sections, processing voter data securely and efficiently.
  • All processes adhered to legal guidelines, with no system downtimes or performance anomalies reported.
  • Real-time publishing of election results ensured transparency, with electronic and paper records cross-validated for accuracy.

5. Independent Validation

  • Observers, civil society representatives, and political entities reported no issues with the systems.
  • Any potential concerns about data alteration could be verified against blockchain records and physical paper documentation.

6. Conclusion

  • The systems achieved their objectives of ensuring secure, transparent, and traceable election processes.
  • The STS fulfilled its role as a cybersecurity authority, effectively countering threats and maintaining operational integrity throughout the election period.

This report underscores the robustness of Romania’s electoral IT infrastructure and highlights the proactive measures taken to safeguard democratic processes against cyber threats and manipulation.

Link to original documents

https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/comunicat-de-presa1733327193


Romania’s Presidential Elections, Press Statement, The USA Government

What is the difference between Democracy, Communism, and Dictatorship?

Throughout history, humanity has built different systems to organize society, govern people, and shape our futures. Today, we explore three of the most impactful political systems: Democracy, Communism, and Dictatorship.
Democracy. It is the voice of the people, the foundation of freedom, and the celebration of diversity. In a democracy, power rests with the citizens, who elect leaders to represent their interests. Ideas compete, voices are heard, and every vote matters. This system thrives on participation, transparency, and accountability
Yet, democracy is not without flaws. Its strength lies in its complexity, but this same complexity can lead to delays, debates, and division. Still, it is a system that places trust in the collective wisdom of its people

AspectDemocracyCommunismDictatorship
DefinitionA system where power is vested in the people, often through elected representatives.An ideology advocating for a classless society where resources are owned collectively.A system where power is concentrated in the hands of one person or a small group.
Political PowerDistributed among elected representatives or directly by citizens.Often centralized, typically controlled by a single party.Centralized, often controlled by one individual or a small ruling group.
Economic SystemGenerally supports capitalism or mixed economies.Advocates for state control or collective ownership of production and distribution.Can vary; often uses state control to maintain power.
Individual FreedomHigh degree of personal freedom and civil liberties.Focuses on equality but may limit personal freedoms for the collective good.Limited or nonexistent, with suppression of dissent.
Role of ElectionsFree and fair elections are a cornerstone of governance.Elections (if held) are controlled by the ruling party to maintain power.Often no genuine elections; power is taken or inherited.
EqualityEquality of opportunity, but outcomes depend on individual effort.Emphasizes equality of outcomes through redistribution.Equality is not a focus; elites often enjoy privileges.
Decision-MakingDecentralized, with input from various branches of government and the public.Centralized, often made by the ruling party or leaders.Highly centralized; decisions are made by the dictator or ruling group.
Media FreedomFree and independent press is encouraged.Media is often state-controlled to promote ideology.Media is controlled or censored to maintain power.
ExamplesUnited States, India, GermanyFormer USSR, Cuba, North Korea (in practice)Nazi Germany (Hitler), North Korea (Kim Jong-un)
StrengthsEncourages participation, innovation, and accountability.Focus on reducing wealth disparities and class struggles.Efficiency in decision-making; strong control over policy execution.
WeaknessesCan be slow due to bureaucracy; susceptible to populism.Often leads to lack of innovation and inefficiency.High potential for abuse of power and oppression.

Communism. At its core, it seeks to eliminate inequality and create a classless society. Resources are shared, and production is controlled collectively for the benefit of all. Born from the ideals of Karl Marx, communism envisions a world where everyone contributes according to their ability and receives according to their need.
But there is a hidden truth. In communism, the people do not choose the system—it is imposed upon them. The system invents special institutions and laws to maintain its power, ensuring no change can threaten its authority. Over time, it perfects what can only be called the Prison of Thoughts—a framework designed to limit what people believe is possible, suppressing dissent and locking society into its ideology.
Though the dream is equality, the reality often falls short, with those in control enjoying privileges denied to others


Dictatorship. A system where power resides in the hands of one individual or a small group. Decisions are swift, authority is absolute, and dissent is crushed. The dictator promises stability, security, and unity, often in times of crisis.
Yet, the price of stability is freedom. In a dictatorship, fear replaces choice, and the will of the few dominates the lives of the many. Corruption festers, and power clings tightly to those at the top.
But here too, the people have no choice. Dictatorships, like communism, create institutions and legal frameworks to protect their rule. They silence opposition, control information, and perfect the Prison of Thoughts. Through fear, propaganda, and surveillance, the system ensures its survival by making people believe there is no alternative.
The price of stability is freedom. In a dictatorship, the will of the few dominates the lives of the many

These systems reflect humanity’s eternal struggle to find balance: freedom and order, equality and ambition, unity and individuality. In democracy, the people decide. In communism and dictatorship, it is the system that decides, constructing barriers to ensure its permanence

1. Philosophical Foundation

  • Democracy: Based on the idea of political equality, individual freedom, and collective decision-making through participation. Rooted in liberal philosophy and ideas of fairness and accountability.
  • Communism: Inspired by Marxist ideology, it seeks to eliminate class distinctions and redistribute resources for societal equality, emphasizing collective over individual interests.
  • Dictatorship: Rooted in the consolidation of power, often justified by the need for stability, security, or a superior authority figure to guide the state.

2. Political Power Dynamics

  • Democracy: Power is decentralized and diffused across institutions like the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Citizens influence decisions through elections, protests, and petitions.
  • Communism: Political power is centralized in a single party or group, which claims to represent the working class or proletariat. Dissent is often suppressed to maintain ideological unity.
  • Dictatorship: Absolute power lies with one person or a small group. Political opposition is usually outlawed or tightly controlled.

3. Role of Individual vs. Collective

  • Democracy: Emphasizes individual rights and freedoms. People are free to express themselves, own property, and choose their leaders.
  • Communism: Prioritizes collective welfare over individual desires. Personal property is replaced by collective ownership to reduce inequalities.
  • Dictatorship: Individual freedoms are subordinated to the will of the ruler or ruling elite. The state dictates personal and public life extensively.

4. Economic Organization

  • Democracy: Allows for a variety of economic systems (capitalism, socialism, or mixed economies). The market often plays a central role, with governments intervening as needed.
  • Communism: Aims for a planned economy where the state controls production, distribution, and resources to achieve equality.
  • Dictatorship: Economic systems vary. Some focus on state control, while others may embrace capitalism to benefit elites. Economic policies are shaped to maintain power.

5. Social and Cultural Impact

  • Democracy: Promotes diversity, cultural pluralism, and innovation by allowing freedom of thought and expression.
  • Communism: Often enforces a uniform cultural ideology to align with the state’s goals, which may limit artistic and intellectual diversity.
  • Dictatorship: Stifles cultural expression that contradicts the regime’s narrative. Propaganda is commonly used to glorify leadership and ideology.

6. Media and Information Control

  • Democracy: Media operates freely (ideally), serving as a watchdog and platform for diverse viewpoints.
  • Communism: Media is state-controlled, ensuring alignment with the party’s ideology. Independent journalism is rare.
  • Dictatorship: Media is tightly censored, with propaganda dominating the narrative to maintain control.

7. Strengths

  • Democracy:
    • Encourages accountability and transparency.
    • Provides a platform for innovation and adaptability.
    • Promotes civil liberties and human rights.
  • Communism:
    • Reduces class disparities (in theory).
    • Focuses on long-term goals rather than short-term political gains.
    • Provides universal healthcare, education, and welfare.
  • Dictatorship:
    • Decisions are made quickly without bureaucratic delays.
    • Can maintain order and stability during crises.
    • Enables large-scale projects without public opposition.

8. Weaknesses

  • Democracy:
    • Susceptible to populism and manipulation by powerful interest groups.
    • Slow decision-making due to bureaucracy and consensus-building.
    • Can lead to economic and social inequalities if not regulated.
  • Communism:
    • Often fails to achieve true equality; bureaucratic elites emerge.
    • Suppresses personal freedoms and innovation.
    • Leads to inefficiency in resource allocation due to lack of market dynamics.
  • Dictatorship:
    • High risk of corruption and abuse of power.
    • Suppresses dissent, leading to potential unrest or revolution.
    • Lacks checks and balances, resulting in poor decision-making.

9. Historical Examples

  • Democracy:
    • Successful: The United States (despite challenges), Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway.
    • Failures: Weimar Republic (succumbed to extremism).
  • Communism:
    • Successful (Partial): Cuba’s healthcare and education reforms.
    • Failures: Soviet Union (economic inefficiencies, lack of freedoms), China (Great Leap Forward famine).
  • Dictatorship:
    • Successful (Short-term): Nazi Germany (economic recovery pre-WWII).
    • Failures: North Korea (widespread poverty), Zimbabwe (under Mugabe).

Russia invasions:
Ukraine 1918
Finland 1910
Poland 1920
Azerbaijan 1920
Georgia 1921
China 1920
Japan 1938
Poland 1939
Estonia 1939
Latvia 1939
Lithuania 1939
Finland 139
Romania 1944
Albania 1944
Yugoslavia 1944
Bulgaria 1944
Slovakia 1945
Croatia 1945
Japan 1945
China 1944
North Korea 1950
China 1950
Hungary 1956
Laos 1960
Vietnam 1961
Algeria 1902
Egypt 1962
Yemen 1962
Syria 1967
Czechoslovakia 1968
China 1969
Cambodia 1970
Bangladesh 1972
Angola 1975
Ethiopia 1977
Afghanistan 1979
Lebanon 1902
Azerbaijan 1910
Azerbaijan 1990
Georgia 1991
Moldavia 1992
Georgia 1991
Tajikistan 1992
Georgia 1992
Chechnya 1994
Dagestan 1994
Chechnya 1999
Dagestan 1999
Georgia 2008
Ukraine 2014
Ukraine 2022

Here’s an updated table including Russia, China, and Iran based on their current governance systems:

AspectDemocracyCommunismDictatorship/Authoritarian
ExamplesUnited States, GermanyFormer USSR, Cuba, North KoreaRussia, China, Iran
Political PowerDistributed through elections and institutions.Centralized in a single-party system (Communist Party).Highly centralized; power concentrated in one leader or a small ruling group.
RussiaAuthoritarian State: Centralized power under Vladimir Putin, limited opposition, elections often criticized for lack of fairness.
ChinaOne-Party Communist State: Controlled by the Communist Party of China (CPC), with Xi Jinping consolidating personal power.May overlap with dictatorship tendencies due to authoritarian controls.
IranTheocratic Dictatorship: A unique blend of authoritarianism under Supreme Leader Ayatollah, with limited democratic elements (parliamentary elections).

Detailed Breakdown of Russia, China, and Iran in Context:


Russia

  • System: Authoritarian state with pseudo-democratic elements (elections are held but heavily controlled).
  • Characteristics:
    • Elections exist but are not free or fair.
    • Media is heavily censored or state-controlled.
    • Dissent is suppressed; opposition figures face persecution or imprisonment.
    • Economy is a mix of state-controlled and oligarchic capitalism.
  • Example of Weaknesses:
    • Corruption is pervasive.
    • Suppression of freedoms stifles innovation.
  • Why in the Dictatorship/Authoritarian Column: Russia’s centralized power structure and lack of checks and balances align it more with authoritarian regimes than democratic ones.

China

  • System: A one-party communist state, but with significant capitalist economic practices.
  • Characteristics:
    • The Communist Party has absolute power; no political opposition is tolerated.
    • Media and the internet are tightly controlled (Great Firewall of China).
    • Social control is reinforced through systems like the Social Credit System.
    • The economy has shifted to a state-capitalist model, blending market dynamics with government control.
  • Example of Strengths:
    • Rapid economic growth and technological innovation.
    • Long-term policy implementation without electoral interruptions.
  • Why in the Communism Column: Despite economic reforms, China remains ideologically aligned with communism under CPC control. However, its authoritarian methods also align it with dictatorship characteristics.

Iran

  • System: Theocratic dictatorship with limited democratic elements.
  • Characteristics:
    • Supreme Leader holds ultimate authority, above elected officials.
    • Elections are heavily vetted; candidates must align with the regime’s ideology.
    • Media is censored, and dissent is harshly punished.
    • The economy is heavily influenced by sanctions and corruption.
  • Example of Weaknesses:
    • Lack of personal freedoms, especially for women and minority groups.
    • High degree of societal dissatisfaction and protests.
  • Why in the Dictatorship/Authoritarian Column: The concentration of power in the hands of the Supreme Leader and suppression of dissent aligns Iran more closely with authoritarianism than democracy.

Here’s a deeper analysis of Russia, focusing on key aspects:


1. Governance and Political Structure

  • System: Authoritarian state with pseudo-democratic elements.
    • Russia is officially a federal semi-presidential republic. However, in practice, it operates as an authoritarian regime under Vladimir Putin.
    • Power Dynamics:
      • The President holds significant power, controlling foreign policy, defense, and domestic policies.
      • The Prime Minister (currently Mikhail Mishustin) has limited influence compared to the President.
      • The State Duma (lower house of parliament) is largely controlled by pro-Putin parties like United Russia, limiting genuine legislative debate.
    • Elections are regularly held but heavily manipulated through media control, suppression of opposition, and alleged voter fraud.
    • The judiciary is not independent, often used to suppress political dissent.
  • Strengths:
    • Centralized decision-making allows for rapid implementation of policies.
    • Stability is maintained due to a lack of political competition.
  • Weaknesses:
    • Lack of political competition fosters corruption and inefficiency.
    • Suppression of dissent leads to growing dissatisfaction among citizens.

2. Economy

  • Structure: Mixed economy with state dominance in key sectors (oil, gas, defense).
    • Key Industries:
      • Energy sector: Russia is one of the world’s largest exporters of oil and natural gas. The economy is highly reliant on energy exports, contributing to over 50% of federal budget revenues.
      • Arms manufacturing: Russia is the second-largest arms exporter globally, after the United States.
      • Agriculture: Russia has become a top exporter of wheat.
    • Economic Challenges:
      • Heavy dependence on energy exports makes Russia vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil and gas prices.
      • International sanctions, imposed after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have severely limited access to Western technology, capital markets, and foreign investments.
      • Corruption and oligarchic control of key industries hinder innovation and economic diversification.
    • Strengths:
      • Resilient energy sector has allowed Russia to maintain a trade surplus.
      • Recent efforts to strengthen ties with China, India, and other non-Western markets have helped offset sanctions.

3. Media and Freedoms

  • Media Landscape:
    • The media is tightly controlled by the state or state-affiliated entities.
    • Independent journalism is almost nonexistent. Organizations like Novaya Gazeta and TV Rain have faced severe repression.
    • The state uses propaganda to shape public opinion, especially regarding foreign policy and national identity.
    • The internet is increasingly censored, with restrictions on platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, and the promotion of domestic alternatives like VKontakte.
  • Individual Freedoms:
    • Political opposition is systematically suppressed. Key figures like Alexei Navalny have been imprisoned or exiled.
    • Freedom of assembly is heavily restricted. Protests are often met with police violence and mass arrests.
    • LGBTQ+ rights are severely restricted, with laws banning “gay propaganda” and increasing discrimination.

4. Social Policies

  • Education:
    • Russia boasts a highly literate population (literacy rate of 99.7%), with strong emphasis on STEM fields.
    • However, state influence over education has increased, with history curricula rewritten to promote nationalist narratives.
  • Healthcare:
    • Russia provides universal healthcare, but the system suffers from underfunding, corruption, and outdated infrastructure.
    • Urban-rural disparities are stark; rural areas often lack access to basic medical services.
  • Gender and Equality:
    • Women face significant challenges, including gender-based violence and wage disparities.
    • Traditional family values are promoted by the state, often reinforcing patriarchal norms.

5. Foreign Policy

  • Geopolitical Goals:
    • Russia seeks to reassert itself as a global superpower, challenging Western dominance, particularly in Europe and the United States.
    • Key foreign policy tools include energy diplomacy (e.g., natural gas supplies to Europe), military interventions (e.g., Syria, Ukraine), and cyber operations.
  • Alliances:
    • Strong ties with China: Both nations have deepened economic and political cooperation as a counterbalance to Western influence.
    • Partnerships with nations like India, Iran, and Turkey, though these relationships can be opportunistic.
  • Military Focus:
    • Russia has invested heavily in modernizing its military, particularly in nuclear weapons and cyber capabilities.
    • The ongoing war in Ukraine has exposed weaknesses, including logistical failures and reliance on outdated equipment.

6. Military and Security

  • Military Strength:
    • Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
    • The armed forces are among the largest globally, but corruption, poor morale, and outdated logistics have hindered effectiveness in prolonged conflicts.
  • Cybersecurity and Espionage:
    • Russia is a global leader in cyber operations, with groups like Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear linked to state intelligence.
    • Cyberattacks target foreign governments, elections, and critical infrastructure, aiming to destabilize adversaries.

Strengths

  • Vast natural resources, particularly in energy and minerals.
  • Strategic geographic location bridging Europe and Asia.
  • A strong sense of national identity, bolstered by state propaganda.

Weaknesses

  • Overreliance on natural resources and lack of economic diversification.
  • Widespread corruption limits economic potential and social development.
  • Increasing isolation from the West due to aggressive foreign policies.

Here’s a detailed analysis of China focusing on key aspects:


1. Governance and Political Structure

  • System: One-party communist state with strong authoritarian tendencies.
    • The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the sole political authority, led by President Xi Jinping, who has consolidated power and abolished presidential term limits.
    • Decision-making is centralized, with the Politburo Standing Committee (top 7 leaders) wielding immense influence.
    • Local governments implement central policies but are tightly monitored by the CPC.
    • Strengths:
      • Highly centralized authority allows for rapid decision-making and long-term planning.
      • Political stability ensures continuity in governance.
    • Weaknesses:
      • Lack of checks and balances creates risks of corruption and policy errors.
      • Suppression of dissent and opposition limits social trust and innovation.

2. Economy

  • Structure: State-capitalist model blending market principles with heavy government oversight.
    • Key Features:
      • The state controls strategic sectors like energy, banking, telecommunications, and defense.
      • Private enterprises thrive in less critical sectors, but they must align with the CPC’s directives.
      • China is the world’s second-largest economy, heavily reliant on manufacturing, exports, and investments in technology.
    • Strengths:
      • Rapid industrialization has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty.
      • Investment in infrastructure (e.g., the Belt and Road Initiative) enhances global influence.
      • Focus on innovation in AI, renewable energy, and electric vehicles.
    • Weaknesses:
      • Reliance on exports makes China vulnerable to global trade fluctuations.
      • The property sector faces challenges (e.g., Evergrande crisis), threatening financial stability.
      • Rising inequality between urban and rural areas.
    • Sanctions and Trade Wars:
      • The U.S.-China trade war has impacted exports and access to advanced technologies like semiconductors.

3. Media and Freedoms

  • Media Landscape:
    • Strictly controlled by the state to promote CPC ideology and suppress dissent.
    • The Great Firewall censors foreign websites like Google, Facebook, and Twitter, promoting domestic platforms like WeChat and Baidu.
    • Independent journalism is non-existent; journalists risk imprisonment for criticizing the government.
  • Freedom of Expression:
    • Political dissent is not tolerated. Activists, journalists, and human rights lawyers are often detained.
    • The Social Credit System tracks citizens’ behavior, potentially restricting freedoms for violations like protesting or unpaid debts.
  • Surveillance State:
    • Extensive use of AI-driven surveillance technologies, including facial recognition and data tracking, to monitor citizens.
    • Regions like Xinjiang experience heightened surveillance targeting ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghur population.

4. Social Policies

  • Education:
    • Heavy investment in education has created a competitive system, particularly in STEM fields.
    • The CPC controls curricula to promote patriotic values and loyalty to the party.
    • Rising inequality exists between elite urban schools and underfunded rural schools.
  • Healthcare:
    • The government has made significant strides in providing universal healthcare, but disparities persist between urban and rural areas.
    • Rapid responses to crises, such as COVID-19, demonstrated efficiency, though at the cost of individual freedoms (e.g., strict lockdowns).
  • Gender and Equality:
    • Women face significant challenges, including workplace discrimination and a gender gap in rural areas due to the historical one-child policy.
    • Ethnic minorities face systemic discrimination and cultural suppression, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang.

5. Foreign Policy

  • Geopolitical Goals:
    • To establish itself as a global superpower rivaling the U.S., promoting a multipolar world order.
    • Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):
      • A global infrastructure project spanning Asia, Africa, and Europe to enhance China’s trade networks and geopolitical influence.
    • South China Sea: Assertive territorial claims have strained relations with neighbors like Vietnam and the Philippines.
  • Key Alliances:
    • Russia: Strategic partnership, particularly in trade and opposition to U.S. influence.
    • Developing countries: Investments in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America create economic dependencies.
  • Military Presence:
    • China has expanded its military capabilities, particularly its navy, cyber warfare, and missile systems.
    • Taiwan remains a critical focus, with increasing military pressure and rhetoric about reunification.

6. Military and Security

  • Military Strength:
    • The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is one of the largest militaries in the world, with significant modernization efforts in advanced weapons, AI, and space capabilities.
    • Focus on regional dominance in the Indo-Pacific while expanding global influence.
  • Cybersecurity:
    • China is a global leader in cyber operations, targeting intellectual property and state secrets worldwide.
    • Efforts to develop independent technology, such as semiconductors, are driven by concerns over U.S. sanctions.

Strengths

  • Economic Growth: Rapid industrialization has made China the manufacturing hub of the world.
  • Technological Innovation: Leadership in AI, 5G, and renewable energy.
  • Global Influence: Strategic investments in developing nations strengthen China’s global position.

Weaknesses

  • Authoritarian Control: Suppression of freedoms limits creativity and social trust.
  • Economic Inequality: Growing gap between urban elites and rural populations.
  • International Criticism: Human rights violations (e.g., Xinjiang, Hong Kong) and aggressive foreign policies strain relations with Western countries.

Comparison with Russia

AspectChinaRussia
SystemOne-party communist state with capitalist elements.Authoritarian state with pseudo-democratic elements.
EconomyExport-driven, diversified with a focus on technology.Resource-dependent, particularly on oil and gas.
Media ControlHeavy censorship; Great Firewall blocks foreign platforms.State-controlled media with suppression of independent outlets.
Military StrengthModernizing rapidly; focus on Taiwan and regional dominance.Strong nuclear arsenal; logistical weaknesses exposed in Ukraine.
Global InfluenceEconomic investments via Belt and Road Initiative.Focused on regional dominance (Eastern Europe, Central Asia).

Here’s a detailed comparison of Russia and Iran across key dimensions:


AspectRussiaIran
Governance SystemAuthoritarian state with pseudo-democratic elements.Theocratic dictatorship with limited democratic elements.
Political LeadershipCentralized under Vladimir Putin, who has consolidated power for over two decades.Dominated by the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), who holds ultimate authority.
Key Governing BodyThe Presidency and State Duma are tightly controlled by pro-Putin forces.Dual structure: elected President (e.g., Ebrahim Raisi) and unelected Supreme Leader.
OppositionPolitical opposition is suppressed; opposition leaders face imprisonment or exile.Opposition is not tolerated; reformist candidates are often disqualified from elections.

1. Economy

AspectRussiaIran
Economic StructureMixed economy with heavy state control in energy (oil/gas) and defense sectors.State-dominated economy with a focus on oil exports, though sanctions have crippled growth.
DependencyHighly dependent on energy exports (oil, natural gas) for government revenues.Similarly reliant on oil exports, but international sanctions severely limit revenues.
Global StandingThe world’s largest natural gas exporter and a major oil producer.One of the largest oil producers but struggles to sell due to U.S.-led sanctions.
Sanctions ImpactWestern sanctions (post-Crimea 2014 and Ukraine 2022) limit access to technology and markets.U.S. sanctions have crippled trade, especially in oil and finance, since the 1979 revolution.
Economic InnovationLimited by corruption, reliance on energy, and poor diversification efforts.Severely constrained due to sanctions, brain drain, and state mismanagement.

2. Foreign Policy

AspectRussiaIran
Geopolitical GoalsReassert itself as a global superpower, countering Western influence (e.g., NATO).Spread Shia Islam influence and counterbalance Saudi Arabia, Israel, and U.S. presence.
Regional FocusStrong presence in Eastern Europe (e.g., Ukraine, Belarus) and the Middle East (Syria).Focused on the Middle East, particularly Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
AlliancesStrategic alliances with China and developing nations.Strong ties with Russia, China, and regional proxies like Hezbollah.
Military PresenceHeavy investments in nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, and conventional forces.Focuses on asymmetrical warfare, proxies, and missile development to offset conventional weaknesses.

3. Media and Freedoms

AspectRussiaIran
Media FreedomMedia is state-controlled; independent outlets face severe restrictions.Media is tightly censored; critical reporting is banned, and journalists are frequently arrested.
Internet CensorshipInternet is controlled, but restrictions are less comprehensive compared to Iran.Highly restricted, with bans on major platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.
Individual FreedomsPolitical dissent is suppressed; LGBTQ+ rights are heavily restricted.Freedom of speech and religion is almost nonexistent; harsh penalties for dissent.
SurveillanceExtensive surveillance of opposition and independent media.The state uses advanced surveillance to control dissent and monitor religious compliance.

4. Social Policies

AspectRussiaIran
EducationEmphasis on STEM education; curricula are increasingly nationalistic under state influence.Education is controlled by the state, with a focus on Islamic teachings and ideology.
HealthcareUniversal healthcare exists but suffers from underfunding and urban-rural disparities.Universal healthcare is provided but is underfunded, with significant regional inequalities.
Gender EqualityGender discrimination exists, but women have more freedom compared to Iran.Women face systemic discrimination, including strict dress codes and limited rights.
Religion’s RolePredominantly secular, but Russian Orthodox Church wields influence under Putin.Religion dominates public and private life, with Islamic law (Sharia) guiding policies.

5. Military and Security

AspectRussiaIran
Military StrengthStrong conventional military with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.Focuses on missile development and proxies (e.g., Hezbollah) for regional influence.
CybersecuritySophisticated cyber warfare capabilities targeting foreign states and critical infrastructure.Advanced cyber capabilities, often used for espionage and sabotage in regional conflicts.
Proxy UseRelies less on proxies, though active in Syria and Eastern Europe.Heavy reliance on proxies (e.g., Hezbollah, Houthis) to project power in the Middle East.

Strengths

RussiaIran
Vast natural resources (oil, gas, minerals).Regional influence through proxies and ideology.
Global geopolitical influence as a nuclear superpower.Strategic location in the Middle East and Gulf region.
Strong military-industrial complex with global arms exports.Resilience to sanctions through domestic production and alliances with non-Western nations.

Weaknesses

RussiaIran
Overreliance on energy exports makes it vulnerable to global price fluctuations.Economy heavily reliant on oil exports, crippled by sanctions.
Widespread corruption undermines governance and economic potential.Severe corruption, economic mismanagement, and reliance on state monopolies.
Increasing isolation from Western countries due to aggressive foreign policies.International isolation due to sanctions and nuclear program tensions.

Key Differences:

  1. Ideological Basis:
    • Russia: Secular authoritarianism with some nationalism and Orthodox Christian influence.
    • Iran: Theocratic governance based on Islamic law and Shia ideology.
  2. Economic Dependency:
    • Russia relies on energy exports but has better global market access than Iran.
    • Iran is heavily sanctioned, limiting its economic potential.
  3. Global Influence:
    • Russia operates on a global scale, competing with NATO and the U.S.
    • Iran’s influence is regional, focused on the Middle East through proxies and ideological expansion.

Summary

Communism = There is a hidden truth. In communism, the people do not choose the system—it is imposed upon them. The system invents special institutions and laws to prevent change and maintain its power. People have no choice but to watch as the system perfects what can only be called the Prison of Thoughts—a framework designed to control not just actions, but even ideas. Over time, it traps the human spirit, suppressing creativity, dissent, and the very possibility of choice
Dictatorships, like communism, invent institutions and legal frameworks to preserve their authority. They silence opposition, control information, and perfect their own Prison of Thoughts. Through fear, propaganda, and surveillance, they ensure that freedom remains out of reach.
The issue is not about how these systems evolve. It is about how people can become free from systems that imprison them. Systems that suppress voices, crush dissent, and deny individuals the right to express their thoughts and vote for what they truly want. No system can evolve if it shuts down leaders of the opposition. By silencing dissent, it locks itself in stagnation, unable to adapt, unable to progress

These systems reflect humanity’s eternal struggle to find balance: freedom and order, equality and ambition, unity and individuality. In democracy, the people decide. In communism and dictatorship, the system decides—and it decides to build walls of control and fear, walls designed to last forever

The question is no longer which system is best. The question is whether we, as people, can break free from systems that are perfecting themselves—not to serve us, but to control us. The question is whether we can protect the right to think, the right to express, and the right to choose. For no system, however grand, can survive if it sacrifices the humanity of its people.

Maria Mariá, Rainha de Bateria Imperatriz, Dazzles on Sapucai: A Night of Enchantment and Glamour

The Sambódromo da Marquês de Sapucai, nestled in the heart of Rio de Janeiro, has been the stage for countless legendary performances. In a recent display of sheer talent and captivating beauty, Maria Mariá, Rainha de Bateria Imperatriz, delivered a mesmerizing performance that will be remembered for years to come.

See Maria at minutes 0:27, 7:21, 9:02, 10:34 in this video. The movie contains the best moments, costumes and dancers of of Samba Schools Imperatriz Leopoldinense and Unidos do Viradouro

Meet Maria Mariá, Rainha de Bateria Imperatriz:
Maria Mariá, a Brazilian dancer with elegance and charm, has risen to prominence as the Rainha de Bateria (Drum Queen) for the Imperatriz Leopoldinense samba school. As the face of the bateria, she is responsible for leading and representing the percussion section during the samba school’s carnival parades.

A Night of Enchantment and Glamour:

As the lights illuminated the Sambódromo da Marquês de Sapucai, the crowd eagerly awaited the arrival of Imperatriz Leopoldinense. With the first beats of the bateria, the audience was instantly entranced, and when Maria Mariá emerged in all her splendor, the atmosphere became electric.

Dressed in an extravagant costume adorned with glittering gems and vibrant feathers, Maria Mariá embodied the spirit of the carnival. Her undeniable charisma and radiant smile captivated the audience as she danced effortlessly to the pulsating rhythms of the bateria.

Maria Mariá showcased her impeccable samba skills, displaying both power and grace as she glided across the Sapucai. Her magnetic presence elevated the performance to new heights, creating a visually stunning spectacle that left the crowd in awe.

A Tribute to Brazilian Culture and Tradition:

As Rainha de Bateria, Maria Mariá serves as a symbol of the rich heritage of Brazilian samba and carnival culture. Her performance, in perfect harmony with the music and choreography of Imperatriz Leopoldinense, was a testament to the enduring appeal and vitality of the samba tradition.

The performance paid tribute to the vibrant tapestry of Brazilian culture, incorporating elements of its history, legends, and folklore. The artistry and passion on display were a reminder of the enduring power of samba to bring people together in a celebration of life and unity.

A Lasting Impression:

As the performance reached its crescendo, Maria Mariá’s captivating presence continued to enchant the audience. The energy and excitement were palpable, and as the parade came to a close, she left the Sapucai to thunderous applause and admiration.

Maria Mariá’s unforgettable performance as Rainha de Bateria for Imperatriz Leopoldinense has further solidified her status as a dazzling icon of Brazilian samba and carnival culture. As she continues to grace the Sapucai with her talent and charm, Maria Mariá will undoubtedly inspire generations of samba lovers and leave a lasting legacy in the world of the Rio Carnival.

Giovanna Lancellotti – Rio de Janeiro 2023 Carnaval on Sambadrome Sapucai

Giovanna Lancellotti is a Brazilian actress and dancer known for her performances in various Brazilian TV shows and films. In the period 2020-2023, she had the opportunity to dance at the famous Sapucaí Sambadrome in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, during the Carnival parade.

Sapucaí is considered to be one of the most prestigious venues for samba dance, with its long runway lined by grandstands and surrounded by vibrant, colorful floats. The samba parade is a highly anticipated event during the annual Carnival celebration, with thousands of dancers and musicians from various samba schools competing to showcase their skills.

Giovanna Lancellotti danced as part of the samba school “Unidos de Vila Isabel,” which is known for its elaborate costumes and high-energy performances. Her performance was highly praised by the audience and critics alike, as she showcased her impressive dance moves and mesmerizing stage presence.

In her dance, Giovanna Lancellotti displayed a combination of samba and other Brazilian dance styles, such as funk and frevo, making her performance even more dynamic and exciting. Her graceful movements and energetic steps perfectly complemented the lively music and vibrant costumes, creating a truly unforgettable spectacle.

Overall, Giovanna Lancellotti’s performance at Sapucaí was a testament to her talent as a dancer and her passion for Brazilian culture. She left a lasting impression on the audience, and her dance will surely be remembered as one of the highlights of the Carnival parade.

2022 Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo Carnival, Brasil – Index of Musas (to be updated to 100 Dancers)

Index of Musas (to be updated to 100 Dancers)
Adriana Bombom (Grande Rio) – Michael Jackson

Alice Alves (Portela) – decorado em pedras e cristais, Black and White (avaliada em R$ 75 mil.)

Bianca Monteiro, Rainha de Bateria (Portela)

Camilla de Lucas (Grande Rio) – Red, Yellow, Orange, Blue, and Magenta

Daniela Orcisse (Mancha Verde, Sao Paulo) – Princesa de Carnaval

Dani Styles (Vigário Geral) @dinewithdani

Duda Almeida 2020-22 São Clemente, Sambadrome Marquês de Sapucaí, photo and video
duda-almeida_watermark1
Duda Almeida, video 2020

Duda Almeida, video 2022

Duda Serdan (Mancha Verde, Sao Paulo) – Princesa de Bateria da Mancha Verde

Egili Oliveira @egilioliveira

Joy Broussard, Princesa da Vigário Geral (Vigário Geral)

Leyla Barros, Rainha das Passistas (Vigário Geral)

Mariana Pedro (Mancha Verde, Sao Paulo) – Rainha de Carnaval

Mileide Mihaile (Grande Rio) – Red and Orange

Monique Alfradique (Grande Rio) – Gold

Nikki Nicole (Vigário Geral) @nikkijacqrich

Paolla Oliveira (Grande Rio) – Red

Pocah (Viviane de Queiroz Pereira) (Grande Rio) – Green, Red, and Silver

Renata Kuerten (Grande Rio) – Red, and White

Thainá Oliveira (Grande Rio) – black and silver

Shayene Cesário (Portela)

Thainá Teixeira e Diego Jenkins – Porta Bandeira (Vigário Geral)

Samba Schools
Grande Rio
Vigário Geral

Rainha e Princesas de Rio Carnaval video 1

Rainha e Princesas de Rio Carnaval video 2

Rainha e Princesas de Rio Carnaval video 3

@thai.rodrigues28, @luarabombom, @eudeisianejesus, @reimomorjwilsonneto

What Happens in Vegas – Film Set Locations

These locations are for the movie “What Happens in Vegas” 2008
IMDB link to movie

1. 9:25 – Planet Hollywood Hotel and Casino Las Vegas
See 100+ photos inside a movie created by Artificial Intelligence application BrianAI.com with searching and finding my personal photos of Planet Hollywood

2. 10:05 First Bedroom – Issue = The scene starts with a clear window (probably towards Caesars Palace, as I identify from the red and yellow light that I have on my 100+ photos) and during the fight, we have white curtains on the window. The scenes were filmed at different times.
Just remember that is a Caesar Palace View bedroom and probably a Bellagio lake view
Late in the scene, the Caesar red brand is out, probably another cut with a different position of curtains and draperies
bedroom-ph-6cb353b9-230d-4430-a18b-564c3a559cd22c94117e-e980-4e12-bd09-e0190461ae66_Hip Room@500px

3. 13:15 Limousine trip on The Strip starts from Ballys towards The Venetian and return to Bellagio Fountain
Video with the Strip view around Planet Hollyood as seen from a nearby huge terace of Cosmopolitan Hotel and Casino

4. 14:35 – Terrace at 14:36 is at Omnia Nightclub inside Caesar Palace Hotel and Casino
You can see Flamingo hotel on the left, Ballys and Paris Hotel in Front
Meanwhile a new hotel was build behind their heads (between Flamingo and Bally’s), in 2013 – Cromwell Hotel and Casino (instead of Barbary Coast and Bill’s Gamblin’ Hall and Saloon)
Omnia NightClub 11094782_627145160749545_5355548037311769117_o

5. 15:49 Looks like the Palms Pool and Beach Casino
Palms pool and casino
Las-Vegas-palms-dayclub-poolparty

6. 16:08 and many more scenes later (16:56 …) – Rain Nightclub at Palms Casino (closed now)
These nightclubs have frequent facelifts but the main characteristics can be identified
The most interesting is the simulation of rain on glass walls and red light or Rio Casino, near by (during the movie).
Rain_20Nightclub_550_2010-23-12.0

7. 17:45 – Penthouse at Planet Hollywood baby – You can see Paris Hotel and Eiffel Tower from the window (read “many windows” 🙂 ).
planet_hollywood_panorama
Bird eye view video from above Las Vegas from High Roller Las Vegas (at 800 meters from the Penthouse) – night view

Day view – Bird eye view video from above Las Vegas from High Roller Las Vegas (at 800 meters from the Penthouse)

8. 18:38 Eat at Planet Dailies at Planet Hollywood, See “The Ultimate Coffee Shop” branding and the Restaurant name on the table triunghiular menu
planet Dailies coffee shop and food 2e877305499a350f465234423760d383

15. 100+ videos playlist from Las Vegas

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8..10 – come back this week for more